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HOUSING CODES AND THE PREVENTION OF URBAN
BLIGHT - ADMINISTRATIVE AND ENFORCEMENT
PROBLEMS AND PROPOSALS
I.

INTRODUCTION

"The need to maintain basic, minimal standards of housing, to
prevent the spread of disease and of that pervasive breakdown
in the fiber of a people which is produced by slums and the
absence of the barest essentials of civilized living, has mounted
to a major concern of American government. The growth of
cities, the crowding of populations, the increased awareness of
the responsibility of the state for the living conditions of its
citizens, all have combined to create problems of the enforcement
1..."I
of minimum standards .
One of the most critical problems facing federal, state and local
governments, city planners and lawyers alike is the improvement of housing
conditions throughout the nation. This problem, though more pronounced
in the cities, is not confined to them. Because of its cancerous growth,
inadequate, unsanitary, unsafe and unfit dwellings can be found in almost
2
all populated areas of the United States.
Finding a workable solution to the housing problem is not an easy
task. Housing is a complex entity involving architecture and engineering, as well as considerations of health, economics, finance, social welfare,
culture and law.8 Housing legislation, by implication, suggests the existence
of criteria which separate, to a certain extent, inadequate housing from
that which is adequate. Although some data is available to provide
guidelines for the creation of these housing standards, the sources are
limited in scope and applicability.4 As a result, at almost all levels of
government there is confusion as to exactly what should be done,
specifically, how housing codes should be enforced, and what role, if any,
1. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 371-72 (1959) (Frankfurter, J.).
2. Mood, The Development, Objective, and Adequacy of Current Housing Code
Standards, in NATIONAL COMM'N ON URBAN PROBLEMS, HOUSING CODE STANDARDS
THREE CRITICAL STUDIES 1 (1969).

3. Id. at 3.
4. The National Commission on Urban Problems recognized that there is a
paucity of empirical data establishing criteria for decent housing. The Commission
also noted that "minimum" standards of health, safety and welfare are often inadequate
to provide even a "minimum" level of performance for the bulk of the population.
Even if present housing codes were elevated to the level of minimum standards of
health, safety and welfare, and applied and enforced universally, they would not provide
for the standard of housing and residential environment called for in the Housing
Act of 1949; i.e., a decent home and a suitable living environment for every American
family. Consequently, it was suggested that research and testing processes be established whereby a determination of standards for a decent home can be made. NATIONAL
COMM'N ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY, H.R. Doc. No. 91-34,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 273-75 (1968) [hereinafter cited as BUILDING THE AMERICAN
CITY].
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they should play in helping to provide an abundance of decent housing
for the American people.5
Commentators on urban renewal are generally in agreement that an
effective plan aimed at the restoration of deteriorating cities must include:
(1) the replacement of entire non-salvageable areas with publicly-financed,
low-income housing; (2) the institution of programs and regulations for
the rehabilitation of areas still capable of being brought up to minimum
standards; and (3) the use of prophylactic measures coupled with strict
enforcement techniques to preserve those areas which show the beginnings
of blight, and those in which blight is at most a remote possibility.
Because of the urgency of the problem of urban decay, the slowness or
7
failure of massive programs of clearance, redevelopment and relocation,
and the fact that slum clearance is extremely expensive and often politically
unpalatable, emphasis has been placed on housing codes as a remedial
device in order to implement this three part plan."
It is the purpose of this Comment, initially, to analyze the problem
of blight, the role of the housing code in blight prevention, and the
shortcomings of the present housing code scheme in achieving its objective.
Secondly, two proposals will be suggested, presenting workable solutions
to the problem of initiating an effective housing code program.
II.

HOUSING

CODES: THEIR DEVELOPMENT,

DEFINITION

AND POWER

A.

Historical Background

Building restrictions appeared frequently in the beginnings of American
history. Since the colonial period, the necessity of imposing standards
of housing construction and use in the interest of public safety and health
5. Id. at 273. It is suggested that it is often desirable to raise the minimum
standards of housing codes from time to time as the condition of housing improves
and as social and economic standards rise. However, as housing code standards are
raised, there is a tendency to view a housing code as a tool to prevent and eliminate
blight in fairly good neighborhoods, while forgetting that the primary role is one of
setting minimum health and safety standards in low quality housing. Under this blight
prevention approach, the poorer areas of the community are considered to be more
appropriately treated through urban renewal rehabilitation. As a result, code enforcement is slackened, reduced to a complaint basis, or otherwise neglected in such areas.
Id. at 290-91. See Slayton, Conservation of Existing Housing, 20 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 436, 439-40 (1955).
6. Editorial Note, Housing and Health Inspection: A Survey and Suggestions
in Light of Recent Case Law, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 421, 422 (1960). The recommendation of the National Commission on Urban Problems to the Housing Code
Administration closely aligned itself to these purposes. The major goals set for the
housing administration included: (1) protecting and maintaining minimum housing
standards affecting personal health, safety or comfort, and amenity in all areas of the
city; (2) preventing blight from spreading to areas with standard quality housing;
and (3) upgrading basically sound and restorable "gray" areas. BUILDING THE
AMERICAN CITY, supra note 4, at 296.
7. Boggan, Housing Codes as a Means of Preventing Urban Blight: Constitutional Problems, 6 WAKE FOREST INTRA. L. REV. 255 (1970).
8. Editorial Note, supra note 6, at 422.
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has been realized.9 However, it was not until the late nineteenth century
that housing codes, resembling the form which they take today, began to
develop. The first housing code, The Tenement Housing Act, was
enacted in New York City in 1867.10 Applicable only to dwellings, it
established minimum standards to be observed for "tenements." ' " The
12
Act proved ineffective, however, due mainly to inadequate enforcement.
Nevertheless, it did represent the first attempt to employ the police power
of the state to insure minimum standards of health and safety in the
housing inventory.
A major development in the promulgation of housing codes was
Lawrence Veiller's work on housing conditions, culminating in the New
York Tenement House Law of 190113 and later in his model housing

law, published in 1914.14 Salient features of the new New York law
were its meticulous attention to problems of administration and enforcement of the law, 15 and its formulation of rules which were objective and
clear. 16 The successful movement of tenement house reform was sustained
by favorable judicial response when the constitutionality of the act was
challenged.17 The courts were able to see the objectives of the movement,
9. To reduce fire hazards, for example, some early settlements prohibited the
use of thatched roofs or wooden chimneys in housing construction. Such a measure
was promulgated in 1626 by the Plymouth Colony, and in 1648 in the settlement of
New Amsterdam. Mood, supra note 2, at 6. Others tried to prevent people from
keeping hay, straw, pitch, tar and turpentine where the danger of fire was great. See
J. MCGOLDRICK, S. GRAUBARD & R. HOROWITZ, BUILDING REGULATION IN NEW YORK
CITY 34 (1944).
In order to promote cleanliness, other colonists legislated against
the placing of rubbish and filth in the street or enacted rules and regulations concerning the construction and maintenance of cesspools, drains and sewers. In 1850, the
Sanitary Commission of Massachusetts recommended that the local boards of health
be empowered to enact such rules and regulations. Mood, supra note 2, at 6.
10. Law of May 14, 1867, ch. 908, §§ 1 to 19, N.Y. Laws 90th Sess. 2265. For
excellent and thorough treatments of the development of the New York reform
measures, see L. FRIEDMAN, GOVERNMENT AND SLUM HOUSING 25-44 (1968) [hereinafter cited as L. FRIEDMAN]; R. LUBOVE, THE PROGRESSIVES AND THE SLUMS:
TENEMENT HOUSE REFORM IN NEW YORK CITY 1890-1917 (1963).
11. The Act defined tenements as:
[E]very house, building, or portion thereof which is rented, leased, let or hired out
to be occupied, or is occupied as the home or residence of more than three
families living independently of another, and doing their cooking upon the
premises, or by more than two families upon a floor, so living and cooking, but
having a common right in the halls, stairways, yards, waterclosets or privies, or
some of them.
Law of May 14, 1867, ch. 908, § 17, N.Y. Laws 90th Sess. 2265, 2273. The Act included, among other things, regulations covering ventilators, roofs, water closets, fire
escapes, garbage receptacles and ceiling height. Law of May 14, 1867, ch. 908, §§ 3,
4, 5, 8, 14, N.Y. Laws 90th Sess. 2265-71.
12. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 10, at 29.
13. Law of April 12, 1901, ch. 334, N.Y. Laws 124th Sess. 889.
14. L. VEILLER, A MODEL HOUSING LAW (rev. ed. 1920).
15. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 10, at 35.
16. Id. at 36.
17. See, e.g., Adler v. Deegan, 251 N.Y. 467, 167 N.E. 705 (1929); Tenement
House Dep't v. Moeschen, 179 N.Y. 325, 72 N.E. 231 (1904), aff'd per curiam, 203
U.S. 583 (1906).
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and validity was denied only where no true need for reform was seen.18
Despite this initial success, the thrust of the reform movement came to
a halt during the turbulent twenties, because of the difficulty in enforcement of the housing laws, the lack of coordination in enforcement of the
separate codes, inadequate understanding of the problem, poorly drafted
laws, and court delay. 19 Consequently, the housing code movement
remained dormant until the enactment of the Housing Act of 1949,20
which created federal urban redevelopment 2' and called for the appropria22
tion and expenditure of federal funds to aid redevelopment projects.
Redevelopment was not, however, to be a panacea and problems
arose: development costs were prohibitive, relocation of displaced families
was a rapidly growing concern and blight was causing previously nonslum areas to deteriorate.28 As a result, the Housing Act of 195424
was enacted to broaden the attack on blight by adding the concept of
"urban renewal"2 5 to that of "redevelopment. ' 26 Emphasis thus shifted
from clearance alone to a comprehensive attack on blight, demanding
that each municipality provide a "workable program" designed not only
to eliminate slums, but also to include rehabilitation and conservation
27
of deteriorating areas before they could become eligible for federal aid.
Increased emphasis and interest in housing codes, housing code
standards and effective programs to enforce these standards was precipitated by the Housing Act of 196428 and the Housing and Urban
18. See Grimmer v.Tenement House, 204 N.Y. 370, 97 N.E. 884 (1912) ; Bonnet
v. Vallier, 136 Wis. 193, 116 N.W. 885 (1908).
19. See Note, Administration and Enforcement of the PhiladelphiaHousing Code,
106 U. PA. L. REv. 437 (1958).
20. Housing Act of 1949, ch. 338, 63 Stat. 413, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1441
(1970).
21. The aim of redevelopment is the achievement of a sound, well planned neighborhood where slums once existed. Large areas, quite low in the scale of existing
values - those not worth preserving - are cleared for future development. See
Slayton, supra note 5, at 436-37.
22. Housing Act of 1949, ch. 338, § 100, 63 Stat. 414, as amended, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1450 (1970).
23. Note, supra note 19, at 437-38.
24. Housing Act of 1954, ch. 649, 68 Stat. 590, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1450
(1970).
25. Urban renewal is an over-all term, embracing the programs of redevelopment, conservation, public housing and the use of the tools of rehabilitation and
housing law enforcement. Slayton, supra note 5, at 438.
26. See note 21 supra.
27. Although the Housing Act of 1954 broadened the program of federal assistance for urban redevelopment to include rehabilitation and conservation of deteriorated
areas, cities continued extensive demolition in their urban renewal plans because it
was more attractive for cities to proceed with clearance projects to eliminate marginal
structures than to force their rehabilitation by code enforcement. One reason for
this result was the fact that federal financial assistance was not extended to cities for
code enforcement within urban renewal project areas. Comment, Federal Aids for
Enforcement of Housing Codes, 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 948, 968-69 (1965).
28. Housing Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-560, § 301, 78 Stat. 785, as amended,
42 U.S.C. § 1450 (1970). In the years after 1954, it became clear that the "urban
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Development Act of 1965.29 Under these Acts, a certified "workable
program" is still a prerequisite for any community desiring to become
eligible for federal financial aid for public housing, urban renewal, rent
supplements and other related programs.30 Now, however, in order to
have the "workable program" certified, the locality must have a minimum
standards housing code and an effective program of enforcement to achieve
compliance with the code.3 1
The Housing Act of 1949 and its amended versions have vitalized
interest in housing codes as a tool in urban redevelopment and preservarenewal" approach remained inadequate for two reasons: (1) maximum use was not
being made of existing housing inventories; and (2) social problems incident to tenant
relocation were enormous. As a result, Congress enacted the Housing Act of 1964
which included among its provisions an integrated scheme providing both direct and
indirect assistance for local code enforcement activities within urban renewal project
areas. The new concept, included in the Housing Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-560,
§ 301(b), 78 Stat. 785, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1460(c) (1970), authorized financing
of projects designed to "eliminate the first stages of slums and blight and prevent
the need for subsequent clearance or rehabilitation activities," and consisting "entirely
or substantially of a program of intensive code enforcement in an urban renewal area."
H.R. REP. No. 1703, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1964). Congress expected section 301(b)
code enforcement projects to be utilized in basically sound areas showing signs of
deterioration and blight principally from noncompliance with local codes. A prime
factor in Congress' enactment of the section was the belief that the cost would almost
always be less than the cost of carrying out the more traditional clearance or rehabilitation projects. Id.
29. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-117, § 117,
79 Stat. 451, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1450 (1970). There was little disagreement
with the rationale underlying the code enforcement project concept under the Housing
Act of 1964, but serious practical objections discouraged its use. See S. REP. No. 378,
89th Cong., 1st Sess. 19-20 (1965). Cities requesting federal assistance under the Act
had to submit detailed urban renewal plans, since title I planning requirements for
loan or capital grant contracts, (Housing Act of 1949, ch. 338, § 104, 63 Stat. 416,
as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1454 (1970)), were made applicable to the code projects.
Housing Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-560, § 301 (c), 78 Stat. 785. Few municipalities
were prepared to meet the cost and difficulties related to the preparation of the required
application. Congress responded to the problem and eliminated the need for such costly
planning in the 1965 Act. Housing and Urban Redevelopment Act of 1965, Pub. L.
No. 89-117, § 311, 79 Stat. 477.
30. The Housing and Urban Development Act provides in relevant part that:
[N]o contract shall be entered into for any loan or capital grant . . . unless (1)
there is presented to the Secretary by the locality, a workable program for community improvement . . . for utilizing appropriate private and public resources
to eliminate, and prevent the development or spread of, slums and urban blight,
to encourage needed urban rehabilitation, to provide for the redevelopment of
blighted, deteriorated, or slum areas . . . and (2) on the basis of his review of
such program, the Secretary determines that such program meets the requirements of this subsection and certifies that the Federal assistance may be made
available in such community ...
42 U.S.C. § 1451(c) (1970).
31. The present law now mandates that:
[N]o workable program shall be certified or re-certified unless (A) the locality
has had in effect, for at least six months prior to such certification or re-certification, a minimum standards housing code, related but not limited to health, sanitation, and occupancy requirements . . . and (B) . . . the locality is carrying out
an effective program of enforcement to achieve compliance with such housing code.
42 U.S.C. § 1451 (c) (1970). See Codes Requirements in "Workable Program"
Revised, Toughened, 24 J. HousING 37 (1967).
One of the least heralded, yet one of the most popular and successful programs
of the Department of Housing and Urban Development, is the program of concentrated code enforcement to arrest and reverse blight in the "gray" areas of the city
under section 117 of title I of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965. Act
of July 15, 1949, ch. 338, tit. I, § 117, as amended, Act of Aug. 10, 1965, Pub. L. No.
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tion. However, in order to better understand the use of this tool as one
of the means of combating the problem of urban decay, the inquiry
must first focus on possible limitations on the use of housing codes by
a local government.
B. The Police Power and Its Limitations
Municipal corporations are empowered to draft, enact and enforce
reasonable ordinances and regulations which govern buildings within the
municipality.8 2 A housing code, as one application of the state police
power, sets the minimum standards for the safety, health and welfare of
housing occupants. 83 Generally, these codes provide minimum standards
in four main areas: (1) equipment and facilities contained in the
structure;84 (2) light, ventilation and heating;35 (3) use, maximum
occupancy, and conditions of occupancy ;36 and (4) the level of maintenance
of the dwelling unit as a whole and of its facilities and equipment.87 Each
89-117, tit. III, § 311(a), 79 Stat. 478, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1468 (1970). The
Section 117 program, as codified, provides in pertinent part:
[T]he Secretary is authorized to . . . make grants . . . to cities, other municipalities, [and] counties . . . of the United States for the purpose of assisting such
localities in carrying out programs of concentrated code enforcement in deteriorated or deteriorating areas in which such enforcement, together with those
public improvements to be provided by the locality, may be expected to arrest the
decline of the area.
42 U.S.C. § 1468 (1970). The purpose of this new program is to enable cities to avoid
the cumbersome urban renewal process in order to get federal assistance for code
enforcement in basically sound areas that have begun to show the signs of deterioration
and blight. See Bryan, Concentrated Code Enforcement - What's Been Happening
Under Section 117 in the Last Five Years?, 27 J. HOUSING 300 (1970) ; cf. H.R. REP.
No. 1703 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1964).
32. 7 E. McQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 24.505, at 519-20 (3d rev.
ed. 1968). These ordinances may control the erection, removal, repair, alteration,
reconstruction and use of buildings. Id. at 518.
33. See, e.g., PHILADELPHIA, PA., HOUSING CODE §§ 7-201 to 7-308 (1968).
34. The Philadelphia Housing Code, for example, requires that every dwelling
contain the following minimum equipment and facilities: water closet and lavatory
basin; bathing facilities; kitchen sink; and plumbing fixtures connected to an
approved water system and an approved sewerage system. PHILADELPHIA, PA.,
HOUSING CODE §§ 7-201(1) (a), (b), (d) (1968). In addition, in every multi-family
dwelling there must be approved common garbage and rubbish storage or disposal
facilities. Id. § 7-201(1) (e).
35. The minimum standards for light and ventilation in the Philadelphia Housing Code prescribe, among other things, a minimum total window area for every
habitable room measured according to floor space. Id. §§ 7-202(1) (a), (b). If
windows are not found in each habitable room which can be easily opened and which
face the outdoors, other devices may be used to maintain adequate ventilation. Id.
§ 7-202(1) (b). Additionally, every dwelling within 300 feet of a power line is to
maintain electrical services, and have a central heating system capable of safely and
adequately heating all habitable rooms to a temperature of at least seventy degrees Fahrenheit when the outside temperature is ten degrees Fahrenheit. Id. §§
7-202(1) (h), (i).
36. Those sections of the Philadelphia Housing Code that regulate the maximum
occupancy, conditions of occupancy and contents of structures contain provisions
prohibiting the following: living space overcrowding; sleeping space overcrowding;
and the use of basements for living purposes unless certain specific requirements are
met. Id. § 7-204. For other examples, see ALTOONA, PA., HOUSING CODE § 6.1 (1962)
(living space overcrowding) ; READING, PA., HOUSING CODE § 8.3 (1968) (sleeping
space overcrowding).
37. In the Philadelphia Housing Code, minimum standards are set for safe and
sanitary maintenance of every foundation, exterior wall and roof; floor, interior wall
and ceiling; window and exterior door; inside and outside stair, porch and any appur-

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol17/iss3/3

6

Polaha: Housing Codes and the Prevention of Urban Blight - Administrative
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 17

section further defines those provisions pertaining thereto 8 and provides
a comprehensive plan placing a person, whether owner-occupant or
landlord, on notice as to what standards he is required to meet.8 9 In
theory, at least, prescribing these minimum requirements operates to fix
the minimum level of housing quality in a community, and potentially,
therefore, to insure that the locality does not deteriorate. 40 However,
since the enactment of a housing code by a municipality is an exercise
of the police power, 41 the code prescribed is subject to all the limitations
on that power. To be valid, therefore, especially where such ordinance
restricts the use of private property, it must be reasonably necessary to
42
promote or protect the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.
Additionally, both procedural 48 and substantive 44 due process requirements
tenance thereto; plumbing fixture; water closet; chimney and smoke pipe; yard; and

cooking equipment. Id. §§ 7-205(1), 7-206(1). It is also the responsibility of every

owner or occupant to maintain the dwelling in a clean and sanitary condition; to
remove rubbish, ashes, garbage and other waste; and to exterminate any insects,
rodents, and other pests. Id. §§ 7-301 to 7-303. See also ALTOONA, PA., HOUSING
CODE § 7 (1962) (general sanitary conditions); READING, PA., HOUSING CODE § 5.6
(1968) (rubbish).
38. See notes 34-37 supra.
39. A problem arises when a housing code sets down standards which are vague,
not only making it difficult for an owner or occupant to meet their requirements, but
also causing unequal enforcement of the code provisions since enforcement will depend
heavily on the subjective judgment of individual inspectors. The Philadelphia Code
does attempt to eliminate the problem by defining terms and setting down regulations.
See, e.g., PHILADELPHIA, PA., HOUSING CODE §§ 7-201 to 7-308 (1968).
40. This theory has been attacked from two sides. On the one hand, commentators
suggest that such standards may not be the true minimum, but rather reflect the
interest, opinions, and biases of certain groups, such as professional experts and
property owners, who set standards which frequently have little ascertainable relationship either to health or to social costs, and are used as a tool to keep out undesirables.
See E. BANFIELD & M. GRODZINS, GOVERNMENT AND HOUSING IN METROPOLITAN
AREAS 168 (1958). On the other hand, urban planners consider these minimum
standards inadequate to provide even a "minimum" level of performance for the bulk
of the population. BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY, supra note 4, at 274.
41. The police power is reserved to the states by the tenth amendment. There is,
however, no inherent police power in municipal corporations to enact and enforce
housing codes. Their police powers are only those which are granted to them by
statute, constitutional provision or home-rule charter, pursuant to state delegation. See
71 E. MCQUILLAN, supra note 32, § 24.505, at 521; Guandolo, Housing Codes in Urban
Renewal, 25 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1, 15 (1956).
42. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Illinois ex rel. Drainage Comm'rs, 200 U.S. 561
(1905). The United States Supreme Court declared that each state has the power
to promote the public interest by reasonable police regulations which do not violate
the constitution of the state or the Constitution of the United States. Id. at 584. For
examples of state cases, see Del Fanta v. Sherman, 107 Cal. App. 746, 290 P. 1087
(1930) ; Chicago v. Miller, 27 Ill. 2d 211, 188 N.E.2d 694 (1963) ; People ex rel. M.
Wineburgh Advertising Co. v. Murphy, 195 N.Y. 126, 88 N.E. 17 (1909) ; Kessler v.
Smith, 104 Ohio App. 213, 142 N.E.2d 231 (1957); Commonwealth ex rel. Shooster
v. Devlin, 305 Pa. 440, 158 A. 161 (1932) ; Boden v. City of Milwaukee, 8 Wis. 2d 318,
99 N.W.2d 156 (1959).
43. See, e.g., Crossman v. City of Galveston, 112 Tex. 303, 247 S.W. 810 (1923).
The imposition of civil penalties for the violation of police power regulations has been
upheld. Missouri Pacific Ry. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512, 523 (1885). The validity of
cumulative penalties has also been upheld. City of New York v. Benensen, 41 Misc. 2d
20, 244 N.Y.S.2d 653 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1963). As long as a defendant may challenge and have judicially reviewed a housing authority's decision, due process requirements are satisfied. See St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States, 368 U.S. 208 (1961)
Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Slattery, 302 U.S. 300 (1937).
44. See, e.g., City of Louisville v. Thompson, 339 S.W.2d 869 (Ky. App. 1960).
See pp. 498-99 infra.
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must be met, and the code must adhere to the demands of equal protection. 45 Other constitutional limitations upon the exercise of the police
power in the enactment and enforcement of housing codes include the
4
prohibition of unlawful searches, 46 unlawful delegations of authority 7
48
and impairment of contract obligations.
Initially, the enforcement of a housing ordinance will not be interfered with unless its regulatory measures are unreasonable. 49 Reasonableness is a question of fact, not abstract legal theory, and the facts must
evidence an essential public need for the housing ordinance. In determining
that fact, a court may recognize a presumption of reasonableness and
give considerable weight to the legislative judgment. 50 This factor, plus
the expansion of the police power under the concept of public welfare,5 1
has enabled courts to consistently uphold the constitutional validity of
the enactment of housing codes per se as a proper exercise of the police
45. See, e.g., Brennan v. City of Milwaukee, 265 Wis. 52, 60 N.W.2d 704
(1953). See pp. 499-500 infra.
46. In most housing codes, provision is made for the entry and inspection of
the dwelling by municipal inspection officers. It is of practical necessity for the
use of housing codes as an effective tool in blight prevention and elimination
programs, to permit such a right of entry, since enforcement of housing codes
necessitates interior and exterior dwelling inspection. However, right of entry
provisions in housing codes may be attacked under the due process clause and upon
the ground that they violate state constitutional provisions, analogous to the fourth
amendment, prohibiting unlawful searches. Guandolo, supra note 41, at 28-29. See
Editorial Note, supra note 6, at 421.
47. A lack of precise and definite standards may subject a housing code to
attack upon the ground that it involves an unlawful delegation of authority. Guandolo,
supra note 41, at 32-35. See, e.g., Richards v. City of Columbia, 227 S.C. 538, 555
88 S.E.2d 683, 691 (1955).
48. Guandolo, supra note 41, at 31-32. See Central Say. Bank v. City of New
York, 279 N.Y. 266, 18 N.E.2d 151 (1938), affd on rehearing, 280 N.Y. 9, 19
N.E.2d 659, cert. denied, 306 U.S. 661 (1939); Richards v. City of Columbia, 227
S.C. 538, 88 S.E.2d 683 (1955).
49. Richards v. City of Columbia, 227 S.C. 538, 551, 88 S.E.2d 683, 689 (1955).
For additional cases, see note 42 supra.
50. See Rapid City v. Schmitt, 75 S.D. 636, 71 N.W.2d 297 (1955) ; Ferguson
v. City of Columbus, 70 Ohio L. Abs. 277, 128 N.E.2d 198 (Ct. App. 1954). As to
a comparable situation involving zoning ordinances, see Valley View Village, Inc.
v. Proffett, 221 F.2d 412 (6th Cir. 1955); Marblehead Land Co. v. City of Los
Angeles, 47 F.2d 528 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 634 (1931).
51. Recent decisions indicate a trend allowing the enforcement of various
property standards under the police power where there is no immediate threat to
health and safety, but where the general welfare is found to require such standards.
See Thain v. City of Palo Alto, 24 Cal. Rptr. 515 (Cal. App. 1962); Oregon City
v. Hartke, 240 Ore. 35, 400 P.2d 255 (1965) ; Boden v. City of Milwaukee, 8 Wis. 2d
318, 99 N.W.2d 156 (1959). One court stated:
The [police] power is not limited to regulations designed to promote public
health, public morals or public safety or to the suppression of what is offensive,
disorderly or unsanitary but extends to so dealing with conditions which exist
as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of the people by promoting public
convenience or general prosperity.
Wulfsahn v. Burden, 241 N.Y. 288, 298, 150 N.E. 120, 122 (1925).
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power,5 2 although on occasion specific provisions of a housing code have
been found to be constitutionally infirm. 53
Substantive due process challenges under the fourteenth amendment
and comparable state constitutional provisions may arise if a housing
code is applied retroactively, or if there is a taking of property without
just compensation. The courts have recognized that a proper exercise
54
of the police power may require some minimum standards of housing,
and have gone so far as to uphold codes whose requirements retroactively
apply higher standards than those which were in existence when the
building was originally constructed. 5 The Supreme Court has asserted
that "in no case does the owner of property acquire immunity against
exercise of the police power because he constructed it in full compliance
with the existing law." 5 6 To hold otherwise would preclude the taking
of appropriate steps to end existing slums. Even though a housing code
may be valid when retroactively applied, it may become invalid if it
52. The following decisions, for example, have expressly upheld specific code
standards as reasonably related to the public health, safety, or welfare and violative
of neither due process nor equal protection of the laws: Apple v. City & County
of Denver, 154 Colo. 166, 390 P.2d 91 (1964) (apartments being used for cooking
and eating must be equipped with kitchen sinks) ; State v. Schaffel, 4 Conn. Cir.
234, 229 A.2d 552 (1966)

(exterior wood surface throughout must be adequately

protected from decay) ; Chicago v. Miller, 27 Ill.
2d 211, 188 N.E.2d 694 (1963)
(not more than two family units which are located in the same dwelling may share

a single bathroom) ; City of Louisville v. Thompson, 339 S.W.2d 869 (Ky. App.

1960) (each dwelling unit must have a privately enclosed, inside flush toilet and
a kitchen sink, both connected to an approved water and sewer system); Givner

v. Commissioner of Health, 207 Md. 184, 113 A.2d 898 (1955) (all dwelling units
must contain a bathing facility with hot and cold water except that two-story
dwellings with not more than two dwelling units may share a bathing facility);
Paquette v. City of Fall River, 338 Mass. 368, 155 N.E.2d 775 (1959) (there must
be adequate outdoor screens) ; Boden v. City of Milwaukee, 8 Wis. 2d 318, 99 N.W.2d
156 (1959) (interior floors must not be buckled).
53. See, e.g., City of Columbus v. Stubbs, 223 Ga. 765, 158 S.E.2d 392 (1967),
where the court found that painting of exterior wood surfaces or application of other
protective covering, and installation of at least two electrical outlets in each room,
among other items, were unreasonable and void as without any reasonable relation
to public health, safety or morals. See also Safer v. City of Jacksonville, 237 So. 2d 8
(Fla. App. 1970).
54. City of Louisville v. Thompson, 339 S.W.2d 869 (Ky. App. 1960); Givner
v. Commissioner of Health, 207 Md. 184, 113 A.2d 899 (1955); Paquette v. City
of Fall River, 338 Mass. 368, 155 N.E.2d 775 (1959).
55. See, e.g., Kaukas v. City of Chicago, 27 Ill.
2d 197, 188 N.E.2d 700 (1963);
Paquette v. City of Fall River, 338 Mass. 368, 155 N.E.2d 775 (1959). Other
courts, however, have not validated such retroactive codes. See, e.g., Dente v. City
of Mount Vernon, 50 Misc. 2d 983, 272 N.Y.S.2d 65 (Sup. Ct. 1966) ; Gates v.
Housing Appeals Bd., 10 Ohio St. 2d 48, 225 N.E.2d 222 (1967) ; Coffin v. Blackwell,
116 Wash. 281, 199 P. 239 (1921).
56. Queenside Hill Realty Co. v. Saxl, 328 U.S. 80, 83 (1946). In 1940, the
appellant in Queenside Hill Realty constructed a lodging house in New York, complying with all applicable laws then in force. In 1944, New York amended its
Multiple Dwelling Law so as to provide that lodging houses of "non-fireproof
construction existing prior to the enactment" of the amendment should comply with
certain new requirements, including installation of an automatic wet pipe sprinkler
system. Appellant asserted that its building did not constitute a fire hazard or a
danger to its occupants; that it had a market value of $25,000; that the cost of
complying with the 1944 law would be $7,500; and that the benefits to be obtained
by the changes were- negligible. The Court held that the law does not violate the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 82.
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involves a taking of private property without just compensation.5 7 In
those states that have not established a "well nigh conclusive" presumption
in favor of economic legislation,58 the ordinance will be upheld only if
it is reasonably related to the protection of public health, safety, morals,
or general welfare. The reasonableness of the relationship should depend
upon a weighing of the imposition on those regulated against the
importance of the governmental interest sought to be protected and
the extent to which the challenged code provision is calculated to promote
that interest.5 9
A municipal ordinance must, in addition, withstand challenges that
arise under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Where housing codes create different requirements for different groups,
it must be established that the classifications are reasonably related to
the purposes of the statute.60 Equal protection delimits the extent to
which a differentiation of housing areas or individual structures may be
made with regard to the standards to be applied to each, and proscribes
arbitrary and capricious enforcement treatment of the building involved.
However, if the ordinance is otherwise reasonable, a classification need
not be made with mathematical nicety or absolutely exclude all inequality. 61
Moreover, a police power measure which may be unreasonably discriminatory in the light of public health, public safety and public morals
objectives may nonetheless be held valid if the alleged discriminatory
57. Code provisions as applied may be confiscatory and be deemed a deprivation
of property without just compensation in violation of due process. Apple v. City
& County of Denver, 154 Colo. 166, 390 P.2d 91 (1964); Gates v. Housing Appeals
Bd., 10 Ohio St. 2d 48, 225 N.E.2d 222 (1967).
58. The federal courts and some state courts have adopted a "well nigh
conclusive" presumption in favor of economic legislation. See, e.g., Two Guys from
Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961) ; McGowan v. Maryland,
366 U.S. 420 (1961). Kansas, Colorado and Minnesota have adopted the federal
position without qualification. See Note, 53 COLUm. L. REv. 827, 832-34 (1953).
Economic legislation would include, for example, taxation and Sunday closing laws,
but not legislation concerned with "suspect classifications" such as those based on
race or a fundamental interest. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420
(1961) ; Quong Wing v. KirKendall, 223 U.S. 59 (1912). A housing code would be
considered a type of economic legislation since one of the main focuses of a zoned
housing code or selective enforcement program would be to maintain or increase
property values in a given area.
59. The cost of making housing improvements is a factor to be considered
in ascertaining the reasonableness of the legislation. See Note, 69 HARV. L. REV.
1115, 1118 (1956). Dollar costs were considered too burdensome in LaSalle Nat'l
Bank v. City of Chicago, 5 Ill. 2d 344, 351, 125 N.E.2d 609, 613 (1955) ; and
Pondfield Rd. Co. v. Bronxville, 141 N.Y.S.2d 723, 726 (Sup. Ct. 1955). But see
Queenside Hills Realty Co. v. Saxl, 328 U.S. 80 (1946); American Wood Prods.
Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 21 F.2d 440 (D. Minn. 1927), aff'd, 35 F.2d 657 (8th
Cir. 1929).
60. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964). See also Ronda Realty
Corp. v. Lawton, 414 IIl. 313, 111 N.E.2d 310 (1953).
61. Bellerive Inv. Co. v. Kansas City, 321 Mo. 969, 987-88, 13 S.W.2d 628, 637
(1929). A permissive approach which does not require every classification to be
drawn with mathematical nicety was expounded by the Supreme Court of the United
States in Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911). See notes
114-16 and accompanying text infra.
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requirement were judged upon the basis of a public welfare objective.6 2
Therefore, if all within a proper classification are treated equally, the
court will not disturb the classification unless it appears to be arbitrary
and capricious and not related to the purposes of the legislation.68
Thus, in making any proposals to effectuate a more workable solution
to the problem of blight and deterioration, the possibility of constitutional
infirmity must be considered.
III.

THE PROBLEM OF BLIGHT

A.

The Deterioration Process

When signs of blight, or indications of a forthcoming economic or
racial change appear in an area, banks and other financial institutions,
in anticipation of a potential decline of land values in the area, become
hesitant to invest there. Individuals are deterred from purchasing homes
and present homeowners are unable to obtain loans to finance needed
improvements. As the neighborhood begins to deteriorate, present owners,
whether they be occupiers or landlords, begin to lose faith or fear that
future rental income will not be sufficient to warrant further investment,
and therefore permit the property to go without basic maintenance.6 4
This neglect hastens deterioration and overburdens community facilities,
and as one structure after another becomes blighted, the character of
the neighborhood worsens, investors will demand that their capital be
returned more quickly, and the downward spiral accelerates.68
The deterioration process and, consequently, the onset of blight, is
induced by the interaction of structural, physical, political, economic and
social factors. Structural factors concern improperly constructed housing,
while physical factors relate to proximity of this housing to undesirable
land uses. Political factors pertain to landlord and tenant law, municipal
ordinances and codes, and the enforcement policies related to them.66
62. See Pierro v. Baxendale, 20 N.J. 17, 118 A.2d 401 (1955) ; Best v. Zoning
Bd. of Adjustment, 393 Pa. 106, 141 A.2d 606 (1958); State ex rel. Lutheran
High School Conference v. Sinar, 267 Wis. 91, 65 N.W.2d 43 (1954).
63. See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) ; Hanley v. State, 234 Ind. 326,
126 N.E.2d 879 (1955) ; State ex rel. Wright v. State Bd. of Health, 233 Iowa 872,
10 N.W.2d 561 (1943).
64. One way to instill confidence in private owners, investors, and lenders that a
neighborhood will improve in quality is a concentrated public campaign to enforce
housing codes, health codes and similar measures. Private rehabilitation will begin
to occur if owners and lenders are persuaded that a neighborhood actually will
improve. However, this positive effect may also have adverse consequences particularly
if owners abandon deteriorated buildings, or increase rents causing the less fortunate
to move out. THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON URBAN HoUSING, A DECENT HOME

105-06 (1969) [hereinafter cited as A DECENT

HOME].

65. See Note, Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 HARV. L. REV. 801
(1965). Since tenants often cannot afford higher rents, landlords may increase their
returns either by overcrowding, or deferring maintenance and repairs. Id. The
answer to the problem would be either subsidies by the federal government, or tax
reform in the slum areas as an aid to rehabilitation. See A DECENT HOME, supra
note 64, at 102-04 (1969).
66. Note, Conservation of Dwellings: The Prevention of Blight, 29 IND. L.J.
109, 109-11 (1953). If there is a strong housing code in force, there is a possibility
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Economic factors include purchase and rental prices of land, repair and
maintenance costs, population income and general economic stability.
Social factors, on the other hand, concern the habits, personal standards,
problems and education of the community's population.6 7
Although time, by itself, is not a cause of blight, a distinct chronology
is discernible in the development of a blighted area. Every decayed area
has been built, has become undesirable, and then has been allowed to
deteriorate until it has become a slum.68 The first stage, or construction
period, is predominated by the structural and physical factors previously
mentioned, while in stage two, the property loses its desirability primarily
because of economic considerations. The physical deterioration of the
property, characteristic of stage three, occurs primarily because of political
factors, and the final stage, or the actual conversion of the land into a
slum, is a period in which social factors predominate. 69
B.
1.

The Role of the Housing Code In Blight Prevention

70
The Need

Through the enforcement of housing codes, cities and other municipalities attempt to arrest the deterioration spiral and to insure that conditions dangerous to health and safety do not develop. Where such
conditions have developed, the municipalities then try to compel correction.
Although the surest permanent solution to the problems of the worst
slums is clearance followed by a program of urban redevelopment according to a comprehensive plan, 71 such measures are expensive 72 and politically
difficult to achieve. Cities, cognizant of this fact, have placed greater
emphasis upon the enforcement of regulatory ordinances, 78 and have
that the property will become more undesirable because the ordinance imposes the
expensive duty to maintain. The landlord may refuse to make the badly needed repairs
and threaten to tear down the dwelling. As a result, the city is required to make

a choice which often results in a slum. Id. at 119. Flexibility in standards and
enforcement procedures has been suggested as an effective method of relieving this
situation. See W. NASH, RESIDENTIAL REHABILITATION: PRIVATE PROFITS & PUBLIC
PURPOSE 93 (1969).

67. See Note, supra note 66, at 111.
68. See notes 64 & 65 and accompanying text supra.
69. See Note, supra note 66, at 113-14.
70. In 1966, it was estimated that there were 1,995,000 existing, occupied, dilapidated units, and approximately 4,170,000 non-dilapidated, substandard units of which
3,759,000 were estimated to be occupied. ("Substandard units" may be defined as
units which are dilapidated or which lack one or more of the following plumbing
facilities: inside hot running water, flush toilet for private use, bathtub or shower
for private use.) R. HALE & A. FRITSCHLER, PRESENT STATE OF HOUSING CODE
ENFORCEMENT

71.

61 (1968).

Note, supra note 59, at 1115. See also Note, 68 HARv. L. REV. 1422 (1955).

72. In many urban centers housing is deteriorating more quickly than it can be
replaced. It has become economically impossible for private investors to provide
adequate housing for low income groups, and it will take many years for subsidized
public housing to fill the gap. Gribetz & Grad, Housing Code Enforcement: Sanctions
and Remedies, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 1254, 1254-55 (1966).
73. See note 8 and accompanying text supra. See also Note, Federal Courts
& Urban Renewal, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 472, 480 n.44 (1969).
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realized that code enforcement remains the principal method by which
74
they can insure that minimum housing conditions are maintained.
To better appreciate the need for housing codes, the functions of
zoning ordinances and building codes should be understood. Zoning
ordinances 7 5 are designed primarily to maintain desirable land uses, 7 6
density of population77 and building size 7 8 while, at the same time, checking
the spread of undesirable ones. Zoning laws, however, have been held to
be prospective in application,7 9 and existing nonconforming uses continue
to have an undesirable effect on the neighboring residential dwellings.
Thus, zoning has no effect on a decaying but conforming structure,80 or
possibly a permissible non-conforming structure. 8 '
Similarly, building codes are primarily concerned with the structural
safety of new and renovated buildings. Scrutiny and enforcement of
compliance is during the construction period only, and since such a code
does not compel renovation and only operates prospectively, it has little
impact on existing housing until actual renovation is commenced.8 2 Existing housing is maintained and regulated, therefore, only through the use
74. Note, supra note 65, at 802-03. The purpose of code enforcement is to
retard the spread of physical and environmental blight, and to eliminate structural
and environmental conditions which do not meet standards of health and safety.
See Dick & Pfarr, Detroit Housing Code Enforcement and Community Renewal:
A Study in Futility, 3 PROSPECTUs 61, 62 (1969). But see Note, supra note 73, at
480 n.44 for certain acknowledged drawbacks of a code enforcement policy. For
example, in addition to the increase in rents, there is a shift in investment away
from new housing construction to the extent finances are used to make repairs.
75. Zoning ordinances are a valid exercise of the police power and will be
upheld provided their provisions are not arbitrary and unreasonable, and have a
substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare. See
Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). See also Nectow
v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
76. See Katobimar Realty Co. v. Webster, 20 N.J. 114, 118 A.2d 824 (1955).
The Katobimar court noted that "[the essence of zoning is territorial division in
keeping with the character of the lands and structures and their peculiar suitability
for particular uses, and uniformity of use within the division." Id. at 123, 118 A.2d
at 829.
77. See, e.g., Clemons v. City of Los Angeles, 36 Cal. 2d 95, 222 P.2d 439
(1950) (minimum lot requirements upheld); Norwood Heights Improvement Ass'n
v. Mayor & City Council, 191 Md. 155, 60 A.2d 192 (1948) (minimum lot requirements
upheld). Cf. Concord Township Appeal, 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970) ; National
Land & Inv. Co. v. Board of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965).
78. See, e.g., Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Wayne Township, 10 N.J. 165, 89 A.2d
693 (1952), appeal dismissed, 344 U.S. 919 (1953) (minimum house size requirements
upheld).
79. See Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 211 Cal. 304, 295 P. 14 (1930).
There, the court held that although the zoning ordinance is valid, it could not be
applied retroactively to the type of use it prohibited (an institution for the treatment
of mentally disturbed persons) where it would cause substantial injury and where
the continuation of the use did not constitute a nuisance. Id. at 321, 295 P. at 22.
However, in City of Los Angeles v. Gage, 127 Cal. App. 2d 442, 274 P.2d 34 (1954),
the court upheld a zoning ordinance which called for a discontinuance of a nonconforming use in a residential zone since it allowed the plaintiff a five year period of grace in
which to relocate. Id. at 461, 274 P.2d at 45. For cases taking variant approaches
on the retroactive validity and application of housing codes, see notes 55 & 56 and
accompanying text supra.
80. Note, supra note 19, at 439.
81. See note 79 supra.
82. See Note, supra note 19, at 439.
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of the all-inclusive housing code, or through its analogous counterparts
dealing specifically with fire, wiring or plumbing. 83
2.

The Use

Within the broad context of community development goals, housing
codes can have their greatest impact in retarding deterioration and upgrading the quality of housing in city "gray" areas8 4 where housing
deterioration has reached moderately serious proportions."8 Codes are
also useful as a stopgap holding action in the worst areas of a community;
i.e., in those areas which require urban renewal. An effective application
of code administration is the maintenance of a community's good areas,
and the prevention of the formation of blight pockets.8 6

C. Failure of Codes to Prevent Blight
From a careful inspection of local neighborhoods, or even from a
casual observation of the community, an observer can quickly discover
that the relative condition of decay of buildings varies from neighborhood
to neighborhood or from street to street. A single standard code cannot
remedy these dissimilar situations unless, of course, this standard is not
enforced uniformly. For example, the formulation of code standards which
provide minimum standards for the "good," "gray" and "worst" areas,
would be effective in the slums, but will necessarily prove to be inadequate in realizing the conservation potential of the code in basically
sound areas.8 7 Conversely, a standard which is designed for conservation
would be, at best, only partially enforceable in the slums.8 8 In short, it is
83. For example, the Philadelphia Housing Code includes by reference the
Philadelphia Electrical Code, Plumbing Code and Fire Code. PHILADELPHIA, PA.,
HOUSING CODE §§ 7-202(h), (i), 7-205(e) (1968).
84. Residential areas which are basically sound but which are declining in quality
are often designated as "gray" areas.
85. NATIONAL COMM'N ON URBAN PROBLEMS, NEW APPROACHES TO HoUSING
CODE ADMINISTRATION 1 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as NEW APPROACHES].
86. Id. Under the Housing Maintenance Code of New York City, three distinct
purposes are intended: (1) to preserve decent housing; (2) to prevent adequate
or salvageable housing from deteriorating to the point where it can no longer be
reclaimed; and (3) to bring about the basic decencies and minimal standards of
healthful living in already deteriorated dwellings, which, although no longer salvageable, must serve as habitations until they can be replaced. M. TEITZ & S. ROSENTHAL,
HouSING CODE ENFORCEMENT IN NEW YORK CITY, vii

(1971).

87. The proper level of standards is what can be made acceptable in the
community under an effective enforcement program. If code standards are incorporated
into a housing code which are too high for the economic status of the owners of
the property or too high for general acceptance in the community, general breakdown
of the enforcement program may result. Guandolo, supra note 41, at 37.
88. Note, supra note 59, at 1118. The setting of standards too low for the
community in general has been advanced as one of the two major causes for the
failure of most housing codes to accomplish fully their objective of eliminating
blight. The second major cause of failure has been a deficiency in enforcement
procedures. Note, supra note 19, at 440-41. See note 93 and accompanying text
infra.
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a difficult task to set a uniform standard high enough to deal effectively with
blight, even at its early stages, and at the same time not to create a
standard so high as to make compliance unreasonably difficult.89
The problem is compounded in deteriorated areas, particularly the
slums. As the economic desirability of property decreases, there is a
tendency to allow it to deteriorate.9 0 Thus, if a strong minimum standards
ordinance is in force, there is a distinct possibility that the property will
become still more undesirable where the ordinance imposed a prohibitively
expensive duty to maintain. In addition to the economic deterrents,
political factors may also have adverse consequences since the poor often
lack the political power to maintain a sustained regulatory effort on
their behalf. 91
The problem of identical standards to remedy conditions which are
clearly not identical is only worsened by calling for a "vigorous enforcement of housing codes,"'9 2 and commentators are in general agreement
that the present housing code administration and enforcement scheme
has not been effective in halting or reversing urban blight. 93 Since, as
has been pointed out, it is not economically feasible to "bulldoze" entire
areas of decay, and it is not an effective practice to maintain a uniform
standard in all areas, other solutions must be found to make an affirmative
use of housing codes on a city wide basis.
89. Note, supra note 19, at 440.
90. Note, supra note 66, at 119. This is explicable when, from a market
analysis approach, a distinction is made between three classes of residential buildings.
The first class is that of the deteriorated building having a short economic future

incapable of profitable rehabilitation. A second class of buildings could be rehabilitated economically, but the potential return on investment is marginal. A
third class is that where rehabilitation could take place economically and grant a
satisfactory return on investment. See J. Buckley, Housing Code Administration
and Enforcement 1, 18, May 7, 1971 (unpublished research design, University of
Pennsylvania Dep't of City Planning).
91. Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the Poor: Of
Housing Codes, Housing Subsidies, and Income Distribution Policy, 80 YALE L.J.
1093 (1971). In addition, successful code enforcement does not yield great political
dividends for the incumbent administration. Id. at 1093-94. When an area deteriorates,

housing officials often do not insist on compliance with all code standards in areas

scheduled for clearance, but only those necessary for health and safety. See NEW
APPROACHES, supra note 85, at 28. Such an enforcement policy is clearly possible
either by disregarding the ordinance altogether, or by enforcing the vague standards
set down in most housing codes to fit the occasion. This type of enforcement of a
uniform code necessitates constitutional inquiry based on equal protection. Nevertheless, it, in itself, is a part of another possible solution to the blight problem.
See pp. 515-22 infra.
92. BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY, supra note 4, at 306.
93. See, e.g., Gribetz & Grad, supra note 72, at 1255. "Enforcement of housing
codes . . . through inspection, posting of violations, administrative devices, and,
ultimately legal remedies and sanctions, has failed in recent years to halt or reverse
urban blight." Id. See also Note, supra note 65.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1972

15

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 3 [1972], Art. 3

FEBRUARY

1972]

COMMENTS

505

IV. PROPOSALS

A.
1.

The Zoned Housing Code

Introduction - A Workable Method of Arresting
The Spread of Blight

The zoned housing code concept appeared as early as 1927, when
it was suggested that the same principle of flexible standards which was
applied so successfully in zoning, be incorporated in new housing legislation so that different code requirements would be imposed in different
districts.9 4 More recently, a similar proposal was made in Wisconsin
to enact state enabling legislation which would authorize the City of

Milwaukee to establish such a code. 9 5 The zoned housing code 96 would
supplant the ordinary housing code, and instead of providing only one
set of maintenance standards for the entire community, would prescribe
variable standards by establishing different housing code districts or areas
in which different sets of standards would apply. 97
Under the zoned housing code, areas for protection, rehabilitation
and demolition, corresponding to what is frequently termed the "good,"
"gray" and "worst" areas of the community, would be created9
" to allow
for varying intensity of enforcement. Different minimum standards appli-

94. Ford, Standards for Improved Housing Laws, 16 NAT'L MUN. Rxv. 633
(1927).
95. The Commissioner of Health of the city of Milwaukee, Dr. E. R. Krumbiegel
has proposed such legislation. For a discussion of this proposal, see Slayton, Urban
Redevelopment Short of Clearance: Rehabilitation, Reconditioning, Conservation,
and Code Enforcement in Local Programs, in URBAN REDEVELOPMENT: PROBLEMS
AND PRACTICES 315 et seq. (C. Woodbury ed. 1953). For a decentralized plan involving citizen participation, see Babcock & Bosselman, Citizen Participation:
Suburban Suggestion for the Central City, 32 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoB. 220 (1967).A
The city would be subdivided into administrative districts following historic neighborhood boundaries. A neighborhood board would then be created to set standards,
enforce them, grant variations from them, and seek judicial implementation of its
decisions. When violations are found, the offender would be brought before the
neighborhood board, and they would set a time table for compliance. Code regulations
concerning housing density, open space, architectural design and aesthetics could
vary from neighborhood to neighborhood, as the citizens of that neighborhood choose.
Id. at 222-24.
96. For a thorough treatment of the zoned housing code concept, see Guandolo,
supra note 41, at 42-44. See also Lehman, Building Codes, Housing Codes & the
Conservation of Chicago's Housing Supply, 31 U. CHr. L. REv. 180, 200-02 (1963).
97. It has also been suggested that the code districts may be closely approximated by urban renewal classifications. Urban renewal is itself a kind of zoning that
classifies areas into those that are beyond redemption, those that need extensive
rehabilitation, and those that are to be conserved. As areas are bounded and labeled,
a housing code is imposed upon the area resulting in varying degrees of severity
according to classification. S. PARRATT, HOUSING CODE ADMINISTRATION & ENFORCEMENT 6, 7 (1970). Furthermore, housing codes designed for protection of both
health and economic value would be integrated with zoning ordinances. Id. at 132.
98. The "worst" areas are the slums, the "gray" areas are those that are
basically sound but declining, and the "good" areas are those that have not been
touched by blight. See NEW APPROACHES, supra note 85, at 28-32. A conservation
and rehabilitation program is recommended to be used in basically sound areas;
that is, ones worth conserving. It is a program designed to maintain the economic
and social values of a neighborhood where it is desirable to improve these values.
For definitions of "redevelopment" and "urban renewal," see notes 21 & 25 supra.
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cable to each of these areas would be prescribed with these standards
being graduated upward in relation to the quality of the housing in
the area in question. Additionally, a classification by housing types would
be established by which another graded set of standards for private dwellings, two-family dwellings, multiple-family class A and class B dwellings
would be included in the code.9 9 There would also be a distinct set of
minimum criteria for each of the above illustrated dwelling types in rehabilitation and protection areas, 100 although there would be no need
for such a variation in a demolition area where any further specialization
of standards is unnecessary. The enactment and effective enforcement
of a zoned housing code, similar to that outlined above, would overcome
the impasse presented by the application of a single-standard code to
communities that are diversified and complex.
2.

A Problem of Constitutional Validity

Whenever legislation creates diverse requirements for similar groups,
it runs the risk of violating the equal protection clause of the Constitution. 10 1 Thus, a housing code may be found constitutionally infirm upon
the ground that it arbitrarily establishes classifications, 10 2 or it establishes
different requirements for those in the same class, 103 or the classification
10 4
is not reasonably related to the purposes of the statute.
Generally, a classification is valid if it touches "all [and only those]
persons who are similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the
law."'1 5 In determining this purpose, the court may properly consider
99. Guandolo, supra note 41, at 43.
100. Id. The upkeep of buildings, other than residential dwellings, would be
required to be kept at a level of maintenance and repair commensurate with the
general level of maintenance of similar structures in the same neighborhood. Id.
101. As noted earlier, a specific housing code provision may also violate the

due process clause of the fourteenth amendment if it is not reasonably related to the
purposes of the statute. See notes 57-59 and accompanying text supra. If low
standards have been set, however, these will not give rise to due process objections.
See Givner v. Commissioner of Health, 207 Md. 184, 113 A.2d 899 (1955); Petrushansky v. State, 182 Md. 164, 32 A.2d 696 (1943) ; Adamec v. Post, 273 N.Y. 250,
7 N.E.2d 120 (1937) ; Richards v. City of Columbia, 227 S.C. 538, 88 S.E.2d 683
(1955) ; Brennan v. City of Milwaukee, 265 Wis. 52, 60 N.W.2d 704 (1953). More
serious due process problems can be expected to arise if municipalities accept current
arguments for conservation-oriented codes, which will inevitably have provisions
with less direct health and safety justifications. See Richards v. City of Columbia,
227 S.C. 538, 88 S.E.2d 683 (1955) (dissenting opinion). However, it is submitted
that even if health and safety justifications are not readily apparent, the reasonableness of such codes can be founded on the general welfare clause of the Constitution.
For a discussion of this suggestion, see pp. 510-13 infra.
102. State ex rel. Brown v. Haney, 190 Wis. 285, 287-88, 209 N.W. 591, 593
(1926) (classification in setting up a school district was purely arbitrary).
103. State ex rel. Wright v. State Bd. of Health, 233 Iowa 872, 876, 10 N.W.2d
561, 563 (1943).
104. City of Columbus v. Stubbs, 223 Ga. 765, 767, 158 S.E.2d 392, 394 (1967).
See Appeal of Medinger, 377 Pa. 217, 104 A.2d 118 (1954), where the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania held that a zoning ordinance which divided the township
into various districts and prescribed a different requirement as to the minimum
habitable floor area in each district was not shown to promote the health, morals,
safety or general welfare of the inhabitants.
105. Tussman & tenbrock, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REv.
341, 346 (1949). See F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920),
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not only statutory language but also legislative history, prior law, accompanying legislation, enacted statements of purpose, formal public pronouncements and general public knowledge. 106 While taking these factors
into consideration, the court is expected to protect constitutional rights
while at the same time maintaining proper respect for legislative determinations. 10 7 In this enterprise, where suspect classifications 08 or fundamental interests'0 9 of the public are not at stake, a court may attribute
to the legislation any reasonably conceivable purpose which would support
the constitutionality of the classification where that purpose is unclear." 0
Proper judicial restraint and the presumption of constitutionality necessitate
that the court give the legislature the benefit of any doubt about its
purpose. 1
Once a purpose has been attributed to a statutory classification, equal
protection analysis still demands that a court determine whether the
2
classifications drawn in a statute are reasonable in light of its purpose,"
and does not stop at a finding that all within the statutory class are treated
equally." 3 Unless it is palpably arbitrary," a classification is likely to
be upheld," 4 and if any state of facts which would sustain the classification's
rationality can be reasonably conceived, its existence must be assumed." 5
Only when the relationship between the classification and purpose is
obviously strained or when the classification is otherwise objectionable" 6
should courts intervene on equal protection grounds.
where the Court stated that "the classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and
must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation
to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be
treated alike." Id. at 415.
106. Comment, Development in the Law - Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV.
1065, 1077 (1969).
107. Id. at 1078.
108. A suspect classification would be one based on race, lineage and alienage.
See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
109. For cases involving fundamental interests, see, e.g., Harper v. Board of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (voting); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)
(rights with respect to criminal procedure) ; Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954) (education) ; Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)
(procreation).
110. See, e.g., Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S.
582 (1961). This approach has become common in economic regulation cases. See also
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464
(1948).
111. See, e.g., Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) ; Kotch v. Board of River
Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947). There is a movement away from judicial
restraint in the areas of race and personal rights; however, in the area of economic
legislation the conceivable purpose approach seems to have retained its vitality. See
note 110 supra.
112. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964).
113. Id. All the members included in a classification must be treated equally.
See, e.g., Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 687 (1887). However, judicial inquiry
does not end with a showing of equal protection among the members of the class.
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964).
114. International Harvester Co. of America v. Missouri, 234 U.S. 199, 215
(1914); Metropolis Theater Co. v. City of Chicago, 228 U.S. 61, 70 (1913).
115. See, e.g., Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911).
116. See notes 108 & 109 and accompanying text supra.
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Since challenges to the formulation of a zoned housing code will
almost always be a matter of state concern, the inquiry now focuses on
establishing an equal protection basis under state law, while keeping
in mind the federal position on the issue. Perhaps the most clearly
expressed indicia for compliance with the equal protection requirements
is found in Brennan v. City of Milwaukee.117 In that case, the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin held that a city ordinance, requiring installation of
a bathtub or shower in apartments containing more than three rooms,
was not based upon a substantial distinction which makes one class
really different from another, and, therefore, was violative of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution. 118 The classification by the number
of rooms was not a natural classification for the purposes to be accomplished; i.e., personal cleanliness, affecting public health, where the number
of occupants could not be determined according to the number of rooms,
and it was the occupants who were to be affected by the health regulation." 9
Borrowing from State ex rel. Ford Hopkins Co. v. Mayor and Common
Council,120 the court applied the following general rules upon which
classifications are to be based in the proper exercise of the police power:
(1) All classifications must be based upon substantial distinctions
which make one class really different from another.
(2) The classification adopted must be germane to the purposes of
the law.
(3) The classification must not be based upon existing circumstances
only.
(4) To whatever class a law may apply, it must apply equally to
121
each member thereof.
The first requirement set down by the Brennan court is considered
a question primarily to be determined by the legislature, and consequently,
the classification adopted by the legislature is not to be disturbed by the
117. 265 Wis. 52, 60 N.W.2d 704 (1953).
118. The court stated that:
The basis upon which a classification may validly rest must be reasonable and
founded on material differences and substantial distinctions which bear a proper
relation to the matters or persons dealt with by the legislation and to the
purpose sought to be accomplished. A mere arbitrary distinction in no wise
relevant to the subject of legislation will not justify a departure from that equal
protection of the laws commanded by the Fourteenth Amendment ....
Id. at 55, 60 N.W.2d at 706.
119. Id. at 56-57, 60 N.W.2d at 707.
120. 226 Wis. 215, 276 N.W. 311 (1937).
121. 265 Wis. at 55, 60 N.W.2d at 706. In State ex rel. Risch v. Board of
Trustees, 121 Wis. 44, 98 N.W. 954 (1904), the same general rules were held
essential for constitutional classification with the following addition to number three:
"[lit must not be so constituted as to preclude addition to the numbers included
within a class." Id. at 54, 98 N.W. at 957. Furthermore, a fifth rule was added:
That the characteristics of each class should be so far different from those of
other classes as to reasonably suggest at least the propriety, having regard to the
public good, of substantially different legislation.
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courts unless it is manifestly unreasonable. 122 Therefore, if any state
of facts can reasonably be conceived which would support the tendered
classification, the ordinance must be held not to be violative of the equal
protection clause. 123 In City of Chicago v. Miller,124 an ordinance provided that the occupants of not more than two family units which are
located in the same dwelling may share a single bathroom. The defendant
contended, citing Brennan, that the classification according to the number
of rooms rather than to the number of persons who are to use the bathroom
is an unnatural classification and is purely arbitrary. 25 The Miller court
suggested that in Brennan the probable relation between apartment size
and occupancy was ignored, and proper weight was not given to the

legislative judgment in imposing classifications.'

26

Relying on these con-

siderations, the Miller court, in holding that the classification was not
manifestly unreasonable, stated that:
A legislative classification need not be scientific, logical, or consistent
with reference
but need only have a reasonable basis
27 when considered
to the purpose of the legislature.
It seems that a zoned housing code would be able to meet the
"substantial distinction" requirement of Brennan if the municipality is
able to overcome an initial evidentiary burden. The classification must
be supported by evidence demonstrating the fact that the delineation of
the different types of areas under the code is based upon differences in
characteristics and conditions which reasonably justify the application of
different standards. 128 Although it is true that the lines of demarcation
between protection, rehabilitation and demolition zones may be difficult
for a legislature or an administrative body to draw, the lack of a clear
natural dichotomy should not destroy the validity of all attempts to
formulate a distinction or the ultimate classification involved. 129 Perhaps,
even the difficulty in making such a "substantial distinction" has been
overstated. The municipal government could use its expertise in the
122. International Harvester Co. of America v. Missouri, 234 U.S. 199, 215
(1914) ; City of Chicago v. Miller, 27 111. 2d 211, 220, 188 N.E.2d 694, 699 (1963)
Hansen v. Raleigh, 391 Ill. 536, 544, 63 N.E.2d 851, 855 (1945).
123. See also Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911) ; Gilman
v. Newark, 73 N.J. Super. 562, 575, 180 A.2d 365, 372 (1962). In determining whether
the requisite facts are reasonably conceivable:
[A] judge may draw upon his general knowledge, yet the further removed a
judge's private experience is from the economic scene in which the law is to
function, the greater will be his reluctance to conclude that a claimed factual
basis is merely fanciful.
Restaurant Ass'n v. Holderman, 24 N.J. 294, 301-02, 131 A.2d 773, 776-77 (1957).
Furthermore, it is a well established rule that classifications will not be denied
constitutional grace simply because they are not mathematically precise or fail to
absolutely exclude all traces of inequality. Bellerive Inv. Co. v. Kansas City, 321
Mo. 969, 987, 13 S.W.2d 628, 637 (1929).
124. 27 Il1. 2d 211, 188 N.E.2d 694 (1963).
125. Id. at 219, 188 N.E.2d at 699.
126. Id. at 220, 188 N.E.2d at 699. See Note, supranote 59, at 112.
127. 27 Ill. 2d 211, 220, 188 N.E.2d 694, 699. See Hansen v. Raleigh, 391 I1. 536,
63 N.E.2d 851 (1945). See also note 61 supra.
128. Guandolo, supra note 41, at 43-44.
129. See Note, supra note 59, at 1121.
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fields of zoning and urban renewal to a profitable advantage when setting
down areas for the zoned housing code, and this would be particularly
true if the zoned housing code closely approximates the zoning and urban
renewal areas. 130 Zoning by use, type, and size of structure is not inherently different from zoning according to the relative degree of decay
which is the proposed basis for zoned housing codes. Practically speaking,
it would not be too surprising to find that slum or "gray" areas consist
largely of industrial or commercial uses. A block by block inspection
and observation of housing conditions by city officials may readily suggest
the required intensity of enforcement needed in each area. It is posited
that this collection of empirical data, used properly by housing experts,
would enable them to make supportable delineations when drafting a
zoned housing code. The classification would truly have a reasonable
basis since, as commentators have generally agreed, a housing code
enforced uniformly throughout a city has been ineffective because of the
81
vast differences in deterioration.'
The second requirement specified by the Brennan decision mandates
that the classification be reasonably related to the ultimate legislative
purpose. A legislative act is not constitutionally infirm if it bears a
reasonable relationship to the public purpose, 1 2 and the courts will not
substitute their judgment for that of the legislature if such reasonableness
is fairly apparent.1 33 It is submitted that if the purpose of the legislature
is viewed as the protection of the public health and safety, then the
classification of a city into three housing code zones would not pass
constitutional muster. Such a purpose may be challenged on the ground
that a housing code established for areas of prevention, and possibly
even areas of rehabilitation, bears no reasonable relationship to the
protection of the public health and safety. In these areas questions of
health and safety are minimal, and as a result, the reasonableness of the
legislative act may not even be debatable. However, if the purpose of
the legislature is viewed as protection of the public welfare, then the
classification of a city into two or more housing code zones should not
be denied constitutional affirmation. Whenever slums are eliminated,
sound areas rehabilitated and the good areas conserved, the community
is benefited and the public welfare enhanced. 18 4 A reasonable relationship
130. See S. PARRATT, supra note 97, at 6, 132. See also Ford, supra note 94, at
633.
131. See Gribetz & Grad, supra note 72, at 1281.
132. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964).
133. Lester v. City of St. Petersburg, 183 So. 2d 589 (Fla. App. 1966). In rare
instances a court will characterize a classification as totally arbitrary in light of its
purpose. See, e.g., Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968). See also note 114 and
accompanying text supra.
134. This position is tenable because the public welfare is enhanced through the
enforcement of a housing code in all the areas of a community, even though the
objectives in each area might vary. For example, in the "good" districts of the
community, the objective of the code would be the preservation of property values
or slum prevention, whereas in the slums, the objective would be a stopgap holding
action prior to slum amelioration. In either event, the public welfare has benefited.
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is thereby established between the housing code and the legislative purpose,
the latter becoming even more acceptable when considered in connection
with the expanded definition given to public welfare by the case law.
In Boden v. City of Milwaukee, 135 the plaintiffs attacked a city
ordinance on the ground that it was unreasonable and as such was a
violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The
ordinance required that every dwelling meet certain standards relating to
construction, state of repair, ventilation, and plumbing. 1 36 The Boden
court reasoned that the city police power extended to situations which
affect not only the public health and safety, but also the public welfare
which includes conditions that tend to depress adjoining property values.' 7
Subjecting the ordinance to the test of reasonableness under this expansive
concept of the police power, and giving due weight to the legislative
judgment, the court held that the ordinance was not unreasonable and,
therefore, constituted a valid exercise of the police power. 13 8 Many other
courts have considered the constitutionality of similar housing ordinances,
containing provisions equally as burdensome as those in Boden, and have
reached a similar result. 3 9 Additionally, in the area of zoning, there
is a growing judicial recognition of the power of the city to impose restrictions solely on the basis of general welfare considerations. For example, in
State ex rel. Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland,1 40 a zoning
ordinance requiring, before issuance of a building permit, a finding by the
village building board that the exterior architectural appeal and functional
plan of the proposed structure would not be so at variance with those other
structures in the immediate neighborhood as to cause substantial depreciation in property values, was held to be a valid exercise of the police
power. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin noted that the police power
is not limited to regulations designed to promote public health, public
135. 8 Wis. 2d 318, 99 N.W.2d 156 (1959).

136. The housing code under attack in Boden contained the following provisions:

(1) Every habitable room shall have adequate ventilation provided by one
window or skylight of a specified size which may be easily opened ....
(2) At least one window in each habitable room shall be supplied with a wire mesh
screen covering at least thirty-three percent of the window area ....
(3) Every foundation, exterior wall and roof shall be reasonably weathertight,
watertight, rodentproof and insectproof, and shall be kept in a reasonably good
state of repair.
(4) Every interior partition, wall, floor and ceiling shall be kept in a reasonably
good state of repair and so maintained as to permit them to be kept in a clean
and sanitary condition.
(5) Every window, exterior door, and basement hatchway shall be reasonably
weathertight and rodentproof, and shall be kept in reasonably good working
condition and state of repair.
(6) All exterior wood surfaces shall be reasonably protected from the elements
and against decay by paint ....
Id. at 320-21, 99 N.W.2d at 158. The plaintiff, attacking the constitutionality of the
housing code, had violated all but the first provision.
137. Id. at 325, 99 N.W.2d at 160.
138. Id. at 325-26, 99 N.W.2d at 160. See notes 112-16 and accompanying
text supra.
139. See, e.g., Paquette v. City of Fall River, 338 Mass. 368, 155 N.E.2d 775
(1959) ; Richards v. City of Columbia, 227 S.C. 538, 88 S.E.2d 683 (1955).
140. 269 Wis. 262, 69 N.W.2d 217 (1955).
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morals or public safety, but extends to conditions which promote the
14 1
public convenience or the general prosperity.
The main reason for upholding such ordinances, where the relationship to the public health, safety and morals is not readily apparent, is an
expansion of the concept of public welfare as a separate and distinct category under the police power.1 42 Since the police power is based on public
necessity, it is not limited to conditions as they exist at any one particular
time, 14 but is capable of expanding or contracting to accord with increased or decreased needs on the part of the public in particular spheres
of regulation. As the needs of the people have expanded, the welfare
clause has expanded accordingly to meet these needs. 144 This is evidenced
by the fact that the courts have construed the general welfare in a progressively broader sense over the past years to include public con48
venience, 145 comfort, 146 prosperity, 147 financial security of the people,
149
economic welfare, and it has been held that the preservation of property
values may be a proper consideration. 15 0 The Supreme Court in Berman
v. Parker'5 ' added weight to these considerations by stating:
141. Id. at 267, 69 N.W.2d at 220. In Best v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 393
Pa. 106, 141 A.2d 606 (1958), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that a zoning
ordinance creating a single family district was not unconstitutional when applied to
a house containing twenty-two rooms and seven baths, since the use of the property
as a single family house would promote the general welfare by preserving attractive
characteristics of the community and the property values therein. See also Pierro
v. Baxendale, 20 N.J. 17, 118 A.2d 401 (1955).
142. For example, in Oregon City v. Hartke, 240 Ore. 35, 400 P.2d 255 (1965),
the Supreme Court of Oregon noted:
[T]here is a growing judicial recognition of the power of a city to impose zoning
restrictions which can be justified solely upon the ground that they will tend
to prevent or minimize discordant and unsightly surroundings . . . . This change
may be ascribed more directly to the judicial expansion of the police power to
include within the concept of "general welfare" the enhancement of the citizen's
cultural life.
Id. at 46-47, 400 P.2d at 261.
143. Chicago & Alton R.R. v. Tranbarger, 238 U.S. 67 (1915).
144. Many commentators feel that aesthetic regulations are within the permissible scope of the police power under the public welfare clause. See DiCello,
Aesthetics and the Police Power, 18 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 384 (1969); Rodda,
The Accomplishment of Aesthetic Purposes Under the Police Power, 27 S. CAL. L.
REV. 149 (1954). Higher minimum standards of housing quality may conceivably
extend into the field of aesthetics. Aesthetic considerations, if recognized under the
law, would come under the exercise of the police power for the general welfare.
However, many courts would hold that aesthetics do not fall within the scope
of the police power possibly because they think the terms "health," "safety" and
"morals" comprise the whole possible scope of police regulation. Much of the
confusion is traceable to this concept of the police power in terms of fixed categories
rather than as something adjustable to meet the needs of a changing social nature.
If this is the case, then higher minimum standard housing codes would never be
acceptable since no relationship could be established between aesthetics and a health,
safety and morals purpose as the bases of police regulations. See Note, Aesthetic
Regulation under the Police Power, 80 U. PA. L. REV. 428 (1931).
145. McKay Jewelers, Inc. v. Bowron, 19 Cal. 2d 595, 122 P.2d 543 (1942).
146. Portor v. City of Paris, 184 Tenn. 555, 201 S.W.2d 688 (1947).
147. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Illinois ex rel. Drainage Comm'rs, 200 U.S. 561
(1906).
148. Gordon v. Indianapolis, 204 Ind. 79, 183 N.E. 124 (1932).
149. McKay Jewelers, Inc. v. Bowron, 19 Cal. 2d 595, 122 P.2d 543 (1942).
150. Town of Burlington v. Dunn, 318 Mass. 216, 61 N.E.2d 243, cert. denied,
326 U.S. 739 (1945). For a discussion of property values as a basis for upholding
the zoned housing code concept, see p. 514 infra.
151. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
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The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. . . The
values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well
as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine
that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious
152
as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled.
Thus, if the courts accept the use of this broader definition of purpose,
to insure the public welfare through slum amelioration, rehabilitation and
prevention, the validity of zoned housing codes will be sustained. This
argument becomes more tenable when considered in conjunction with the
fact that blighted housing, whether in an aesthetic or a health and safety
sense, is a matter of public necessity today, and the ordinary housing code,
devoid of graded standards, is substantially less effective than the zoned
housing code in achieving the objectives of this broader definition of purpose.
The third requirement announced by Brennan demands that the
classification not be based solely on existing circumstances. 153 An argument
might be made that, since the classifications in zoned housing codes must
be based upon substantial distinctions between one class and another, it
necessarily follows that in order to effectuate such a distinction, the criteria
for delineation must be drawn from now existing empirical data. Ostensibly, this might be so, but further inspection dispels the force of this
argument. Initially, it should be noted that the "existing circumstances"
requirement does not proscribe the use of such circumstances as raw
material for classification, rather, it simply forbids classification based on
these sources alone. It seems clear that the housing administrators and
analysts, in delineating the extent of the areas to be zoned, will look not
only to what the situation is now, but what it will be in the future.
Drawing from objective population and density statistics, and from subjective criteria indicating the beginnings of blight, they will project what
the situation will look like sometime from now, and will base their
classifications considering all circumstances.
The final criterion of validity required by the Brennan court is that
the law must apply equally to each member of the class involved. A
fundamental equal protection requirement,' 54 this standard creates no more
152. Id. at 33.
153. See note 121 and accompanying text supra. In State ex rel. Ford Hopkins
Co. v. Mayor & Common Council, 226 Wis. 215, 276 N.W. 311 (1937), the
court suggested that unless a statute is curative or remedial and therefore temporary,

provision must be made for future acquisition to the class as other subjects acquire

the characteristics which form the basis of the classification. The principle becomes
considerably important when distinctions are based on time. Where a procedure
would discriminate unwarrantably in favor of existing establishments, things or
persons, it has been held that the classification is a denial of equal protection. Id. at
219-20, 276 N.W. at 314-15. Accordingly, this requirement is of utmost significance
when speaking of housing codes, since housing conditions are constantly changing.
154. A statute cannot intentionally be applied to produce discrimination. For
example, in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), a statute provided that
laundries in wooden buildings (as distinguished from brick or stone) could not be
carried on without a license. The classification itself appeared impartial and
reasonable, but in application the licensing authority consistently refused licenses
to Chinese applicants. Such an application of the statute was held violative of the
equal protection clause. Thus, where a zoned housing code is enacted, the housing
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of a problem in the zoned housing code than it does in any statute requiring classification. It is a problem of enforcement 55 of an otherwise
properly classified law, and since the only differentiation, constitutionally,
between the zoned code and the ordinary code is its classification, no
special inhibitions to validity arise.
Several additional factors would seem to indicate a favorable judicial
acceptance of zoned housing codes. Municipal ordinances, and legislation
in general, enjoy a presumption of validity, 156 and judicial deference has
been extended to legislative determinations of reasonableness of the
standards prescribed. 57 Courts have also recognized that the preservation
of property values is a valid legislative purpose. 158 Unsightly conditions
in a residential community not only depress the social values of the
neighborhood, but also destroy economic values in terms of a fair return
for the property owner and a sound tax base for the municipality. 159 As
a result, courts have recognized the power to zone to conserve property
interests. Therefore, if the preservation of property values may constitute
a legitimate objective of zoning,160 it would appear that the preservation
of property values would also constitute a legitimate objective of housing
code measures. An important additional consideration is that courts have
accepted the establishment of analogous zoned districts under zoning ordinances.' 61 Under state enabling legislation a city is empowered to divide
itself into districts, according to number, shape, size and area 62 in order
authority should treat all the buildings in each zone equally by enforcing the graded
standard uniformly in the designated area.
155. For a discussion of equal protection problems which arise in the enforcement

of a single-standard code, see p. 522 infra.
156. See notes 50 & 58 and accompanying text supra.
157. See note 133 and accompanying text supra.
158. In Fischer v. Bedminster Township, 11 N.J. 194, 93 A.2d 378 (1952), the
Supreme Court of New Jersey upheld the validity of a zoning ordinance in a
rural community restricting lot sizes to a minimum of five acres, finding justification
for the ordinance in the preservation of the character of the community and the
maintenance of the value of the property therein. For substantially the same
reasons, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin upheld a zoning ordinance which required,
before issuance of a building permit, a finding that the exterior architectural appeal
and functional plan of a proposed structure would not be at variance with the
structures in the immediate neighborhood. State ex rel. Saveland Park Holding
Corp. v. Weiland, 269 Wis. 262, 69 N.W.2d 217 (1955). See also State ex rel. Beery
v. Houghton, 164 Minn. 146, 204 N.W. 569 (1925), aff'd, 273 U.S. 671 (1926);
Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Wayne Township, 10 N.J. 165, 89 A.2d 693 (1952),
appeal dismissed, 344 U.S. 919 (1953); Best v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 393 Pa.
106, 141 A.2d 606 (1958).
159. See Town of Burlington v. Dunn, 318 Mass. 216, 61 N.E.2d 243, cert.
denied, 326 U.S. 739 (1945).
160. See Kansas City v. Liebi, 298 Mo. 569, 252 S.W. 404 (1923)
(use of
eminent domain to achieve this same objective) ; note 158 supra. See also Comment,
"Conservation" - A New Area for Urban Redevelopment, 21 U. CHI. L. REv. 489
(1954).
161. For example, in Valley View Village, Inc. v. Proffett, 221 F.2d 412 (6th
Cir. 1955), an ordinance which gave the city council power to "divide the municipality
into districts" in order to promote the purpose of the statute, was interpreted to
mean that a municipality may divide its area into more than one zone or district.
162. See, e.g., PA. STAT. tit. 53, § 14753 (1957). The ordinance adopted under
the zoning law must not be unreasonably discriminatory. De Blasiis v. Bartell,
143 Pa. Super. 485, 18 A.2d 478 (1941). A city is also permitted to regulate the
location, size and use of the buildings. PA. STAT. tit. 53, § 14751 (1957). In addition,
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to carry out the purposes of the act, which very often are similar to the
purposes of a housing code. For example, in Pennsylvania, the zoning
regulations are designed, among other things:
[T]o secure safety from fire, panic and other dangers, to promote
health and the general welfare, to provide adequate light and air,
to prevent the overcrowding of land, [and] to avoid undue concentration of population .... 103
If the city is empowered to divide itself into districts under its zoning
laws to achieve these purposes, it is reasonable to conclude that a city
should be allowed to achieve the very same purposes by the use of a zoned
housing code.
In the final analysis, the legislature should be attempting to cope
realistically with existing conditions by prescribing remedies according to
the circumstances. 6 4 With this legislative initiative, it is submitted that
the courts will give judicial recognition to the validity of a zoned
housing code and permit it to operate as an innovative and effective
instrument for blight elimination and prevention.
B.
1.

Uniform Versus Selective Enforcement

Introduction

The uniform enforcement of a single-standard housing code in a
community in which neighborhoods differ in degree of decay, has proved
unworkable as a method to retard the spread of blight. 165 The singlestandard code must attempt to strike a balance between laxity and
stringency; however, if it does not, then standards which are too low
are worthless, and those too high are unenforceable. 6 Some commentators
have suggested that unequal enforcement of a housing code is an undesirable vice, 167 and although such a policy presents obvious constitutional
questions, 68 not everyone would agree that unequal enforcement is
necessarily evil.' 69 As a result it has been recommended and used in
1 70
programs of selective neighborhood conservation and rehabilitation.
a city may regulate, among other things, the height, number of stories and size of
buildings, the percentage of lot that may be occupied, the size of yards and the density
of population. PA. STAT. tit. 53, § 14752 (1957).
163. PA. STAT. tit. 53, § 14754 (1957).
164. Guandolo, supra note 41, at 44. Additionally, reference should be made to
early judicial treatment of the old New York tenement laws, where effect was given
to the enforcement of the acts when the courts saw a need for reform. See notes
14-15 and accompanying text supra.
165.
166.
167.
168.

See notes 87-93 and accompanying text supra.
See Lehman, supra note 96, at 188-91.
Id.
See pp. 520-22 infra.
169. See, e.g., L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 10, at 54; W. NAsH, supra note 66;
Slayton, supra note 95, at 313, 319-22, 345-53.

170. See, e.g., Babcock & Bosselman, supra note 95, at 220-31. See note 171 infra.
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Selective Enforcement as a Workable Solution

In order to implement a selective enforcement system a municipality
is necessarily required to divide its corporate area into different enforcement
districts.171 The neighborhood improvement and code compliance program would contain three equally important thrusts with emphasis placed
on reflecting neighborhood differences in environmental and housing
conditions 172 - similar to the zoned housing code system. By way of
reference, it should be recalled that a community can be classified into
three different areas based on their relative degree of decay - the "good,"
"gray" and "worst" areas. 73 Recognizing the fact that a city's "worst"
areas are typically those areas which house low income residents who
can neither afford to repair themselves nor afford increases in rents,
it is suggested that the code enforcement program take the form of a
stopgap holding action, not to be used as a permanent substitute for, or as
an alternative to, renewal, but only as a method to provide remedial relief
until urban renewal is effectuated in the near future. 74 A systematic
surveillance based on survey developments and complaint investigations
would be continuously implemented to correct only those violations of a
171. In Dade County, Florida, minimum housing standards are set up for the
entire county. DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA, HOUSING CODE, ch. 17 (1968). Chapter 17
contains two parts - Articles 1 and 2. The standards established under Article 1
are the minimum standards applicable to all municipalities in the unincorporated area.
However, this article does not prohibit municipalities from adopting higher standards.
Id. § 17-4. Article 2 establishes minimum standards applicable to the City of Miami.
Id. § 17-41. Only in this respect does Dade County have a zoned housing code, which
is not of the type discussed previously in this Comment which reflected a variable
enforcement on the basis of neighborhood.
However, the Dade County Department of Housing and Urban Development
does authorize a selective enforcement system which establishes four categories of
inspections applicable to areas of the city of Miami on the basis of the general
condition of housing and on-going Urban Development Programs. See CITY OF
MIAMI SYSTEMATIC HOUSING CODE PROGRAM (1967). Three of the areas established
coincide with the suggestions of The National Commission on Urban Problems.
NEW APPROACHES, supra note 85, at 28-32. The fourth category set up for the
City of Miami applies to those areas which have undergone redevelopment through
urban renewal, and is intended to prevent overcrowded conditions and back-sliding.
CITY OF MIAMI SYSTEMATIC HOUSING CODE PROGRAM (1967). Memorandum received
from Eugene F. Miles, Department of Housing and Urban Development, Neighborhood Rehabilitation Branch, dated Dec. 1, 1971, on file at the Villanova Law Review
office.
172. NEW APPROACHES, supra note 85, at 28.
173. This designation generally corresponds to the prevention, rehabilitation, and
demolition zones discussed above. See pp. 505-06 supra. Additionally, residential
buildings may be similarly distinguished. See note 90 supra.
174. NEw APPROACHES, supra note 85, at 28. The following short term activities
have been suggested:
(1) Repair of serious deficiencies in public facilities . . . to the extent necessary
to maintain reasonable conditions of livability until permanent action could
be taken;
(2) Improvement of private properties as necessary to eliminate immediate
dangers to public health and safety;
(3) Demolition of structures considered unsound or unfit for human habitation,
or deemed a public nuisance and a serious health and safety hazard;
(4) Establishment of temporary public playgrounds on vacant lots ....
(5) Improvement of public services in the area such as rubbish collection and
street cleaning.
Id. at 29.
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nature which may be detrimental to the health, safety and welfare of the
occupants. 7 5 This type of inspection system would give residents the
protection and assurance of minimum standards of safe and sanitary
housing by identifying and securing correction of conditions requiring
immediate attention. It has also been suggested that if urban renewal
treatment is in the distant future, possibly full code enforcement followed
by repair or demolition accompanied by a relocation program could be
used as an alternative where feasible. 176 Similarly, in the "gray" areas, or
residential areas that are basically sound but declining in quality; i.e.,
those areas earmarked for Section 117 federal aid, 177 neighborhood improvement programs with systematic block-by-block code inspection and
enforcement should be the major tool in preventing further deterioration
and in restoring housing to compliance with code standards within a
specified period.' 7 8 The major objective of this surveillance program is
to maintain the general good housing conditions in these areas. Conversely,
in "good" areas, 7 9 inspection on a three-.year cycle should be used in
conjunction with code enforcement to prevent deterioration and to
maintain existing high-level environmental and housing conditions. 80
It has also been suggested that regularly scheduled external surveillance
of housing conditions, and interior inspections undertaken on a complaint
basis, be implemented in order to supplement the three-year cycle
inspection.'"
The Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965182 has provided
an additional impetus for municipal governments to divide their community into different enforcement areas. 83 Under this Act, federal funds 84
are made available for a new type of urban renewal project consisting
entirely of a program of intensive code enforcement'8 5 which would be
175. See, e.g., CITY OF MIAMI SYSTEMATIC HOUSING CODE PROGRAM (1967).
176. BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY, supra note 4, at 284.
177. See note 31 supra; notes 183-97 and accompanying text infra.

178. NEW

APPROACHES,

supra note 85, at 27-28.

See, e.g., CITY OF MIAMI SYSTEMATIC HOUSING CODE PROGRAM (1967).
179. The "good" areas would be those areas not located in an urban renewal
area, or within a Section 117 concentrated housing code program.
180. NEW APPROACHES, supra note 85, at 32-33.

181. Id. at 35.
182. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-117, § 79
Stat. 451, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1450 (1970).
183. The presence of the Section 117 programs in a number of cities has actually
made more apparent the absence of effective code enforcement in other areas of the
city. Indeed, most cities are not able to bring an effective code enforcement to bear
on a city-wide basis because of seriously strained local financial resources. R. HALE
& A. FRITSCHLER, supra note 70, at 18.

184. If it can be demonstrated that the code enforcement activities will be adequate

to assure that the urban renewal area will remain stable and viable and will not need
clearance, rehabilitation or renewal activities in the foreseeable future, federal aid would

be forthcoming under the Section 117 program. H.R. REP. No. 1703, 88th Cong., 2d

Sess. 12 (1964). In order to be eligible for this assistance, a community must agree
to increase its total expenditures for code enforcement by an amount equal to its share
of the project. Id. This insures that federal funds are not used merely to replace
local funds in providing code enforcement activities.

185. 42 U.S.C. § 1468 (1970). For the text of the Act, see note 30 supra.
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used to eliminate the first stages of blight in basically sound areas
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86

and prevent the need for subsequent clearance or rehabilitation. In order
to qualify for these funds, a municipality is not required per se to divide
the community into different enforcement areas; however, it is posited
that when a renewal area is set aside for this federal program, the local
government has, in effect, established varied enforcement areas.' 8 7
This
would necessarily follow since such an intensive code enforcement in these
basically sound areas would be impractical in the slums, 18 8 particularly
when no comparable federal program is available in these areas. Furthermore, the level of code enforcement in the Section 117 areas would be
inadequate to cope with the higher standard of maintenance required to
conserve the "good" areas of the community. 8 9 A selective enforcement
system, therefore, is the logical and practical result of the federal plan
and should be given primary consideration when urban planners investigate
the possibility of adopting a selective enforcement code.
In fact, many Section 117 Concentrated Code Enforcement programs
have been approved by HUD in recent years, constituting a major step
foward in the fight against blight. 190 Federal aid, under the normal
%-%
formula, was given to communities for use in "deteriorated" or "deteriorating" areas in which such enforcement, together with those public improvements to be provided by the locality, would be expected to
arrest
186. These areas have begun to show signs of deterioration principally
of
noncompliance with the housing code and related codes of the community. because
If allowed
to continue to deteriorate, such areas would ultimately require more extensive
renewal
treatment, either in the form of clearance or intensive rehabilitative activities.
187. See notes 171-79 and accompanying text supra.
188. See note 88 and accompanying text supra.
189. See note 87 and accompanying text supra.
190. See R. HALE & A. FRITSCHLER, supra note 70, at 346. In
to qualify
for aid under the program, twenty per cent of the houses must order
violations;
twenty per cent must have one or more "building deficiencies," andhave
the area must
contain at least two "environmental deficiencies." The United States
Department
of Housing and Urban Development, in its Urban Renewal Handbook,
defines
"building deficiencies" as follows:
I. Defects to a point warranting clearance;
2. Deteriorating conditions because of a defect not correctable by normal
maintenance;
3. Extensive minor defects which, taken collectively, are causing the building
to have a deteriorating effect on the surrounding area;
4. Inadequate original construction or alterations;
5. Inadequate or unsafe plumbing, heating, or electrical facilities;
6. Other equally significant building deficiencies.
"Environmental deficiencies" are defined as follows:
1. Overcrowding or improper location of structures on land;
2. Excessive dwelling unit density;
3. Conversions to incompatible types of uses, such as rooming houses among
family dwellings;
4. Obsolete building types, such as large residences which through lack of use or
maintenance have a blighting influence;
5. Detrimental land uses or conditions, such as incompatible uses, structures in
mixed use, or adverse influences from noise, smoke, or fumes;
6. Unsafe, congested, poorly designed or otherwise deficient streets;
7. Inadequate public utilities or community facilities contributing to unsatisfactory
living conditions or economic decline;
8. Other equally significant environmental deficiencies.
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the decline of the area.' 9' While Section 117 has been promising, it has
not always proceeded without pitfalls. Where these have resulted, it has
not been so much from anything inherent in the program as from indirect
difficulties such as sustaining community efforts through the duration of
the project and establishing and sustaining the increased level of interdepartmental co-ordination which the program requires. 19 2 In addition
to these problems, the full benefit of additional Section 117 programs
has not been achieved because of the lack of adequate funds for the
programs' 9 ' and the failure of HUD to mention Section 117 as one of
its available projects. 194 Nevertheless, since the inception of the Section
117 Concentrated Code Enforcement program, findings demonstrate that
it has functioned successfully, and has satisfied the need for community
improvement that other programs have not effectively reached.19 5 Several
reasons have been advanced for this result: namely, (1) better administrative organizations ;196 (2) the quality of housing and the level of
incomes are generally higher in the code areas; and (3) the excellent
cooperation local officials have experienced with HUD officials responsible
197
for administering the program.
191. R.

HALE

& A. FRITSCHLER,

supra note

70, at 339.

192. Id. at 16-17. The Section 117 Concentrated Code Enforcement Program

has been used in heavily blighted areas because it accomplished rehabilitation more
rapidly than the related urban renewal rehabilitation and conservation program, and
unit-for-unit costs under Section 117 were less than under other projects. Id.
193. Id. at 348. One of the main reasons for inadequate funding is the Vietnam
War. Id. As a consequence of inadequate funding, applications cannot be processed
as quickly as they had been in the early stages of the program.
194. See R. HALE & A. FRITSCHLER, supra note 70, at 349. It has been suggested
that the tensions which exist between the proponents of urban renewal (or "slum
clearance" as it was called in 1950) and code enforcement are responsible for this
lack of publication. Id. at 349-50.
195. Byran, supra note 31, at 300. See also Cavanaugh, Section 117 Concentrated
Code Enforcement, 24 J. HousING 629 (1967). For excellent statistical data on the
program, see R. HALE & A. FRITSCHLER, supra, note 70, Appendix, Table A-D.
196. Even though there is good administrative organization, there is still a need
for more personnel. R. HALE & A. FRITSCHLER, supra note 70, at 351.
197. Id. at 351-52. A significant by-product of the projects has been the amount
of public works improvements that the individual projects have generated in
effected areas beyond the improvements that are included and paid for in the
federally aided project budget. As a result, communtiy organization has become an
integral part of the undertaking. Byran, supra note 31, at 302.
The Section 117 Concentrated Code Enforcement Program has received a
further impetus from other government programs such as the Section 312 Rehabilitation Loan Program, 42 U.S.C. § 1452(b) (1970) ; the Section 115 Rehabilitation Program, 42 U.S.C. § 1466 (1970) ; and the Relocation Assistance Program,
42 U.S.C. § 1465 (1970). Under section 312, an applicant in a concentrated code
enforcement program may secure funds up to $3,000 if he has been unable to secure
them from other sources upon comparable terms and conditions. However, under
section 115, actual grants, distinguished from loans, can be made to low income owners
for basic repairs to a maximum amount of $3,000. While these grants are normally
limited to persons with incomes under $3,000, they can also be used by other persons
of limited means to supplement a loan under the section 312 program. Finally,
since relocation of existing occupants is one of the most difficult programs confronting
any slum improvement program, relocation assistance grants are available for individuals, families and businesses displaced as a result of activities carried out within
assisted concentrated code enforcement areas. See A DECENT HOME, supra note 64,
at 106-07. The municipality must assure that all individuals and families displaced
as a result of the project are offered decent, safe and sanitary housing within their
means.
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It has been demonstrated that either a zoned housing code program
or a selective enforcement system would alleviate many of the drawbacks
of a single-standard code. Yet on a relative scale of flexibility, it would
seem that a change in enforcement policy would be better adaptable to
a change in community needs. The establishment of a zoned housing
code would require more formal action on the part of the municipality
in the form of city council action. If a change in any of the zones is
later required, an amendment to the housing code would have to be
passed by council just as any other city ordinance. On the other hand,
where a system of selective enforcement is in operation, the municipal
department in charge of housing would simply change its enforcement
practice to reflect the change in community improvement. Under this
latter method, valuable time and effort would be saved, and possible
back-sliding, which may occur in housing conditions while a change in
housing policy is being implemented, would be avoided. Even though a
selective enforcement system would be better adaptable to community
needs, the problem arises as to whether it will withstand a constitutional
challenge.

3.

A Problem of Constitutional Validity

Section 117 clearly evidences a congressional intent encouraging local
municipalities to implement a program of selective code enforcement in
the blighted areas of its community.'l 8 This is demonstrated by the
overall purpose of the section to grant federal monies to those localities
carrying on concentrated code enforcement programs in deteriorating
areas, and thus putting economic pressure on cities to institute such an
improvement plan.' 99 The effective result of such a program is to apply
the code requirements of the housing laws differently to one sector of the
community than to another. It is clear, however, that whenever legislation
operates to create different requirements for similar groups, it is subject
to equal protection objections. 200 Nevertheless, it is submitted that the
198. See note 31 supra.
199. This is, of course, one of the reasons housing code enforcement is a far
more significant element of a community's overall development activity. However,
this creates a federal policy dilemma since federal housing assistance is limited to
those areas in which code enforcement will be sufficient "to arrest" the decline of
the area. It is submitted that an individual living in another area of the community,
who needs assistance to correct the blighted conditions of his dwelling, should not
be denied federal aid merely because he does not live in the renewal area. To this
extent he may be denied equal protection under the laws. In fact, it has been noted
that section 117 has created problems in city neighborhoods which have been unwilling

to agree to systematic code enforcement in their neighborhoods unless such aids
were made available to them as well. See R. HALE & A.

FRITSCHLER,

supra note 70,

at 17. This is not to suggest that the theory of selective enforcement is invalid, but

rather that the manner in which federal aid is used to implement that enforcement
procedure is not appropriate.
To an extent, the Housing Act of 1968 offers a partial solution to this
problem by giving interim assistance in other rehabilitation areas directed at removing
the most serious hazards to health and safety in the poorest sections of the cities;
however, restrictions contained in this program limit its effectiveness. Pub. L. No.
90-448, § 514, 82 Stat. 525, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1468(a) (1970).
200. See pp. 499-500 supra.
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result of selective enforcement of a single standard housing code is
identical to that of one which is zoned - the only difference being one of
denomination. Both proposals, the one procedural and the other substantive,2 0' are classifying the community into areas of relative decay; i.e.,
"good," "gray" and "worst" areas, and then implementing their respective
programs in a manner geared to obtaining the same result. Assuming
this position is accepted, then it should follow that if the rules provided by
Brennan v. City of Milwaukee20 2 are followed, the division of the city
into districts for selective enforcement of the housing code will withstand
a constitutional challenge on equal protection grounds. If the classification
is based upon substantial distinctions which make one class really different
from another, the classification is germane to the purpose of the law
and not based on existing circumstances only, the first three requirements
of Brennan are fulfilled. If a valid legislative purpose requires a particular
classification for its adequate fulfillment, such necessity may provide not
only a basis for the classification, but also provide in itself a reasonable
relationship between the classification and the legislative purpose. Thus,
if the purpose for enacting Section 117 is to keep the "gray" areas free
of blight and make them desirable places in which to live, 20 3 it is submitted

that this is a valid legislative purpose, necessitating the division of a
city into the "good," "gray" and "worst" areas in order to achieve that
purpose. Because of this necessity, a reasonable relationship is thereby
20 4
established between the classifications and the legislative purpose.
Finally, if the code is applied equally to each member of the class, then
the entire selective enforcement scheme is constitutional. 20 5 There should
be no problem in meeting this final requirement so long as the community
is careful to enforce the housing code uniformly in each of the areas
designated by the community. This conclusion is acceptable once it is
realized that those groups under the intensive enforcement campaign are
part of the proper classification which initially allows differing requirements
to be ordered.
That the courts will uphold the validity of selective enforcement
programs is further supportable by other factors indicative of judicial
acceptance. Many of those factors posited in support of zoned housing
201. See p. 520 supra.
202. 265 Wis. 52, 60 N.W.2d 704 (1953). See notes 117-55 and accompanying
text supra.
203. The National Commission on Urban Problems recommended that housing
codes be directed specifically at establishing decent homes for all. The purpose would
be to promote the specific portion of the general welfare which depends upon achieving
this stated national goal. See BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY, supra note 4, at 306.
For a discussion of the general welfare clause, see notes 135-52 and accompanying
text supra.
204. See notes 134-36 and accompanying text supra. In Argentine Citizens Comm.
v. Urban Renewal Agency, 194 Kan. 468, 399 P.2d 553 (1965), the Supreme Court
of Kansas concluded that an urban renewal plan may contain standards and controls
for rehabilitation of properties in urban renewal projects more demanding than
minimum housing standards promulgated for the city as a whole, thereby indicating
a possible favorable judicial response to selective enforcement.
205. Brennan v. City of Milwaukee, 265 Wis. 52, 60 N.W.2d 704 (1953). See
notes 154-55 and accompanying text supra.
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codes are applicable here, 206 but additional support may be found in
elements inherent in the nature of the selective enforcement program
itself. Often administrative personnel, cognizant of the futility of code
enforcement, will not insist upon uniform compliance. To an extent, then,
the purposes of selective code enforcement are achieved on an informal
basis. However, without legislative and judicial checks, standards essential
to health and safety may not be met and, consequently, a threat to the
community will ensue. Additionally, housing officials might be prone to
neglect of their duties, graft and discriminatory practices in all enforcement areas. Under a concentrated code enforcement program, all the
advantages achieved on the informal level can now be maintained on the
formal level with the additional advantage of judicial scrutiny over the
program's implementation.
It is fruitless to attempt to prevent blight through uniform enforcement of a single-standard code. This merely precipitates block-by-block
enforcement campaigns concentrating "first" on conservation areas, while
at most only partially enforcing the code in the slums. 20 7 The result is

neglect of the slum amelioration function of the housing code - results
antithetical to the purposes of equal protection. The selective enforcement
program, on the other hand, specifically provides for different degrees of
enforcement, including a stopgap holding action in the slums as an
integral part of an overall valid legislative purpose. 20 8 The courts should
not overlook the fact that a sound objective - slum amelioration and
slum prevention - is being sought through the development of such a
program, and that this objective is being obtained.20 9 When these factors
are taken into consideration, the selective enforcement program should
and will receive a judicial stamp of approval.
206. See notes 156-63 and accompanying text supra.
207. See Note, supra note 88, at 1122.
208. See pp. 516-17 supra.
209. Effective enforcement of housing codes has been given an additional boost
with the enactment of rent withholding or receivership statutes in many
states.
e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 19-347b (1969); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. See,
24,
§ 11-31-2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1971) ; PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 1700-1 (Supp. 1971). Under
normal circumstances, the slum dweller is faced with a shortage of available housing
which makes the housing market a seller's market in which the slum landlord does
little in the form of upkeep to attract tenants. As a result, the tenant is coerced by
signing a form lease, virtually an adhesion contract, into surrendering most of his
rights and remedies and into living in unhabitable conditions. Under the common
law, a tenant who withholds his rent from a landlord maintaining unhabitable premises
would be subject to summary eviction. However, notwithstanding the inadequacy of
common law remedies, rent withholding may provide the tenant with a meaningful
solution to the problem of substandard housing. If the house is certified as unfit for
human habitation, the landlord's right to collect rent is suspended. During the
period when the rent is suspended, the tenant continues to occupy the dwelling, the
rent is deposited in an escrow account and paid to the landlord when the dwelling
is certified as fit, any time within six months from the date on which the dwelling
was certified as unfit. If after the six month period such dwelling has not been
certified as fit for human habitation, any monies deposited in the escrow account are
payable to the depositor. In addition, a tenant is not to be evicted for any reason
while the rent is in escrow. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 1700-1 (Supp. 1971). See Clough,
Pennsylvania's Rent Withholding Law, 73 DIcK. L. Rnv. 583 (1969); Comment,
Rent Withholding - A Proposal for Legislation in Ohio, 18 W. REs. L. REv. 1705
(1967). A problem remains, however, if the landlord abandons the premises because
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V.

CONCLUSION

A housing code is not designed to handle the problem of blight
completely; however, it can be utilized as an integral part of an all-comprehensive strategy in making marginal improvements in the overall quality
of the city's housing supply. Even though its effects on a city's total
housing supply may be slight, as a limited tool it can generate substantial
improvements in the physical housing conditions in a given area of a
city. Because it is a micro-solution rather than a macro-solution to the
problem of blight, it must be carefully used on a neighborhood-byneighborhood block-by-block, house-by-house basis. Nevertheless, within
these limitations a housing code merits support for several reasons. First,
it represents one of the few housing programs that can be organized and
effectuated on a local level. Second, it represents an established method
to discipline irresponsible landlords and owners. Finally, in certain areas,
where specific conditions prevail, a housing code may be just the kind
of program to quickly and cheaply transform the area. The latter reason
would be particularly true in smaller cities, with reasonably low densities
and far newer and less deteriorated housing.
Additionally, the zoned housing code and the selective code enforcement
programs offer increased flexibility over a uniform enforcement policy and
appear to be sound in a practical and constitutional sense. Assuming a
federal commitment to decent housing, either methodology could be used
in conjunction with other national and regional housing strategies to make
striking advances in the effort to cope with blight.
Stephen J. Polaha
he feels it would not be economically wise to repair. In order to circumvent this
difficulty, the law should be used to encourage and promote rehabilitation before the
point of diminishing returns is reached.
A second remedy a tenant may use to correct unhabitable conditions is the
use of a receivership. When housing code violations are discovered, a petition for a
mandatory injunction would be filed with the court. Upon a finding that the housing
code had been violated, an order would be issued enjoining the defendant-landlord
from maintaining the premises in this manner. If the defendant fails to comply
with the order, a motion would be filed to appoint a receiver to manage the property.
A hearing is held to determine the necessity of a receiver, and if the court so finds, a
receiver is appointed who is entitled, according to specific statutory authority, to
take control of the property and temporarily manage it according to the orders of
the court. The receiver, either a private party, a social service agency or a municipality,
collects the rents and uses the available funds to make the appropriate repairs. ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-31-2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1971). See Marco & Mancino,
Housing Code Enforcement - A New Approach, 18 Clev.-MAR. L. REV. 368 (1969) ;
Rosen, Receivership: A Useful Tool for Helping to Meet the Housing Needs of
Low Income People, 3 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-CIV. Lw. L. REv. 311 (1968). Again,
this technique may only be useful for economically sound buildings that an owner is
unwilling, unable or reluctant to repair and can be rehabilitated by the court appointed
receiver and returned to the community as a housing resource.
A third possible approach made available to tenants by statute is the repair
and deduct method which permits tenants to repair the premises and deduct the
costs from his rent. CAL. CiV. CODE §§ 1941 & 1942 (West 1954). Funds withheld
are payable to the landlord if he repairs, or to the person authorized to make the
repairs, if the landlord fails to repair. By statute the tenant can make the repairs
and deduct the cost only if he has the sanction of a court order. MICH. COMe. LAWS
ANN. § 125.534(5) (Supp. 1971).
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